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I. INTRODUCTION 
In international law, the term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling law") 
refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting 
treaties and custom. The influential Restatement on Foreign Relations of the 
United States (Restatement) defines jus cogens to include, at a minimum, the 
prohibitions against genocide; slavery or slave trade; murder or disappearance 
of individuals; torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; systematic racial discrimination; 
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and "the principles of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of 
force." 1 Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are 
mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general 
international norms of equivalent authority.2 
The rise of peremptory norms over the past century has sent shock 
waves across international legal theory, transforming the venerable doctrine of 
sources and unsettling inherited conceptions of state sovereignty. As some 
scholars have celebrated and others have lamented, the concept of jus cogens 
has been widely perceived to establish a normative hierarchy within 
international law, endowing certain fundamental norms such as the 
prohibitions against slavery and genocide with a quasi-constitutional status 
vis-a-vis ordinary conventional and customary norms.3 By placing limits on 
state action, jus cogens challenges the positivist orthodoxy that views state 
consent as the wellspring of all international legal obligations. 
In this Article, we develop a new theory of jus co gens norms that aims to 
explain both their peremptory status and relationship to state sovereignty. We 
take as our point of departure the perennial debate among three leading 
traditions in public international law: positivism, natural law, and public 
order. In Part II, we show that each of these three traditions has significant 
deficiencies as a general theory of jus cogens. Positivists' efforts to link 
peremptory norms to state consent are unconvincing because they do not 
explain why a majority of states within the international community may 
impose legal obligations on a dissenting minority. While natural law theories 
circumvent this persistent objector problem, they struggle to specify analytical 
criteria for identifying peremptory norms. Public order theories, which view 
jus cogens as rules integral to interstate relations and international law's wider 
normative agenda, likewise fail to illuminate which particular norms should 
be deemed peremptory or how jus cogens can be reconciled with state 
sovereignty. Thus, the dominant traditions in jus cogens theory leave two 
critical questions unanswered: First, what is the normative basis of 
peremptory norms in international law? Second, what is the relationship 
between peremptory norms and state sovereignty? 
Far from standing in tension with sovereignty, we argue in Part III that 
peremptory norms express constitutive elements of sovereignty's normative 
dimension. The key to understanding international jus cogens lies in a much 
neglected passage of The Doctrine of Right, where Immanuel Kant discusses 
the innate right of humanity which all children may assert against their parents 
I. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF fOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES§ 702 cmts. d-i, § 
102 cmt. k (1987). 
2. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCL T). 
3. See. e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch, 8 EUR. J. INT'L 
L. 566, 566 (1997) ("[J}us cogens or imperative norms ... presuppose relationships of normative 
hierarchy."); Dinah Shelton, Nonnative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 323 
(2006) (describing "universal norms" in international law as "a matter of necessity"); Prosper Wei!, 
Towards Relative Nonnativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 416-17 (1983) (criticizing 
ius col!ens as a "oatholo!!ical ohenomenon"). 
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as cittzens of the world. 4 Drawing on Kant's account of familial fiduciary 
relations, our theory of jus cogens posits that states exercise sovereign 
authority as fiduciaries of the people subject to state power. An immanent 
feature of this state-subject fiduciary relationship is that the state must comply 
with jus cogens. 
In Part IV, we show that the fiduciary theory of jus cogens points to 
formal as well as substantive criteria for specifying peremptory norms. To 
date, the lack of determinate criteria for specifying peremptory norms has 
undermined jus cogens's real-world impact by deterring national and 
international courts from employing peremptory norms in appropriate cases. 
The fiduciary theory addresses this lacuna by explaining how peremptory 
norms embody discrete aspects of the state's fiduciary obligation to govern in 
accordance with principles of integrity, fairness, and solicitude, as well as to 
provide equal security under the rule of law. We evaluate several recognized 
peremptory norms in light of these criteria, demonstrating that the 
international prohibitions against slavery, genocide, and military aggression 
qualify as jus cogens. By contrast, other well-traveled norms such as the 
venerable prohibition against piracy do not. In addition, we identify several 
emerging norms that are not widely recognized as jus cogens today but 
nonetheless merit peremptory force under the fiduciary theory, including the 
right to due process, the norm against public corruption, and the principle of 
self-determination. As these examples illustrate, the fiduciary theory supplies 
a more determinate analytical framework for identifying peremptory norms 
than previous theories based on state consent, natural law, or public order. The 
fiduciary theory thus offers a principled basis for revitalizing the jus cogens 
concept in international legal theory and in the jurisprudence of national and 
international tribunals. 
We conclude in Part V with a preliminary outline of the new avenues of 
research suggested by the fiduciary model of state sovereignty. For example, 
the fiduciary theory offers a fresh and compelling perspective on contested 
concepts in international legal theory such as cosmopolitan citizenship, erga 
omnes obligations, and derogable human rights. The fiduciary model also 
provides a useful analytical framework for rethinking the international 
community's surrogate guarantor role in protecting transnational refugees, 
assisting states in transition, and, most controversially, safeguarding 
individual dignity from state abuse through humanitarian intervention. 
II. PEREMPTORY NORMS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
To place the fiduciary theory of jus cogens in proper context, we begin 
by reviewing briefly the origins and evolution of the jus cogens concept in 
international legal theory from the seventeenth century to the present. We then 
outline the three leading theories of jus cogens-positivism, natural law, and 
public order-and demonstrate that these theories offer, at best, an incomplete 
justification for peremptory international law. 
4 . See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 98-99 (Mary Gregor trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797). 
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A. Peremptory Norms in Historical Perspective 
A common misconception among international lawyers is the notion that 
peremptory norms represent a twentieth-century innovation without 
meaningful precedent in international legal theory. Although the term ')us 
cogens" did not take root in international legal discourse until the twentieth 
century, 5 the principle that certain fundamental norms merit peremptory 
authority within international law bears a much older pedigree. 
Classical publicists such as Hugo Grotius, Emer de Vattel, and Christian 
Wolff drew upon the Roman law distinction between jus dispositivum 
(voluntary law) and jus scriptum (obligatory law) to differentiate consensual 
agreements between states from the "necessary" principles of international 
law that bind all states as a point of conscience regardless of consent. 6 In 
contrast to ordinary legal obligations derived from treaty or custom, jus 
scriptum norms would not permit derogation, Vattel reasoned, because they 
derived from a higher source-the natural law of reason itself: 
We use the term necessary Law of Nations for that law which results from applying the 
natural law to Nations. It is necessary, because Nations are absolutely bound to observe 
it. .. . This same law is called by Grotius and his followers the internal Law of Nations, 
inasmuch as it is binding upon the conscience of Nations .... It is by the application of 
this principle that a distinction can be made between lawful and unlawful treaties or 
conventions and between customs which are innocent and reasonable and those which are 
unjust and deserving ofcondemnation.7 
Vattel did not specify which obligations would constitute the "necessary Law 
of Nations," preferring perhaps to leave this determination to "the laws of 
conscience. "8 
Even after natural law theory fell into disrepute in the nineteenth century 
with the rise of legal positivism, the classical notion of peremptory law 
continued to influence international legal theory well into the modem era. 
Early twentieth-century publicists such as Lassa Oppenheim and William Hall 
asserted confidently that states could not abrogate certain "universally 
5. For early applications of the term "jus cogens" to international law, see Friedrich von der 
Heydte, Die Erscheinungsformen des zwischenstaatlichen Rechts; jus cogens und jus dispositivum im 
Vo/kerrecht [Manifestations of Law Between Nations; Jus Cogens and Jus Dispositivum in International 
Law], in 16 ZEITSCHRIIT FOR VOLKERRECHT 461 (Max Fleischmann, Walther Schiicking & Karl Strupp 
eds., 1932); and Alfred von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AM. J. lNT'L L. 571 
(1937). 
6. See HUGONIS GROTII, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS (ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE] 
(William Whewell ed. & trans., John W. Parker, London 2009) (1625); EMER DE VA TIEL, LE DROIT DES 
GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE (THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW] §§ 
9, 27 (1758) (distinguishing "le Droit des Gens Nature/, ou Necessaire" from "le Droit Vo/ontaire"); 
CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTORUM [A SCIENTIFIC METHOD FOR 
UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF NATIONS] '1J5 (James Brown Scotted., Joseph H. Drake trans., Clarendon 
Press 1934)(1764). 
7. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW§§ 7, 9 
(Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) ( 1758). 
8. !d. & 9 (emohasis omitted). 
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recognized principles" by mutual agreement.9 Outside the academy, judges on 
the Permanent Court of International Justice affirmed the existence of 
peremptory norms in international law by referencing treaties contra bonos 
mores (contrary to raublic policy) in a series of individual concurring and 
dissenting opinions. ° Collectively, these authorities perpetuated the classical 
understanding that certain imperative norms are of such importance that they 
supersede conflicting consensual agreements between states. 
Peremptory norms began to attract greater scholarly attention with the 
publication of Alfred von Verdross's influential 1937 article, Forbidden 
Treaties in International Law. 11 Verdross argued that certain discrete rules of 
international custom had come to be recognized as having a compulsory 
character notwithstanding contrary state agreements. 12 Just as municipal 
courts were empowered to void contracts contra bonos mores, Verdross 
asserted that courts must set aside international agreements in conflict with 
international jus cogens (although he did not use the specific term until later). 
Verdross defined peremptory law as the "ethical minimum recognized by all 
the states of the international community."13 To illustrate the phenomenon of 
international jus cogens, Verdross argued that states bore an imperative duty 
under international law to undertake certain "moral tasks," including the 
"maintenance of law and order within states, defense against external attacks, 
care for the bodily and spiritual welfare of citizens at home, [and] protection 
of citizens abroad." 14 According to Verdross, examples of international 
treaties inconsistent with jus cogens would include those "binding a state to 
reduce its police or its organization of courts in such a way that it is no longer 
able to protect at all or in an adequate manner, the life, the liberty, the honor, 
or the property of men on its territory." 15 Treaties might also violate jus 
cogens if they obligated "a state to close its hospitals or schools, to extradite 
or sterilize its women, to kill its children, to close its factories, to leave its 
fields unploughed, or in other ways to expose its population to distress." 16 
At first, V erdross' s vision of international jus co gens encountered 
skepticism within the legal academy. The standard bearers of international 
legal positivism, including such respected jurists as Professors Hans Kelsen 
and Georg Schwarzenberger and Judge Gaetano Morelli of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) insisted that states could not be bound to international 
norms without their consent and questioned whether state practice reflected 
9. WILLIAM HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 382-83 (8th ed. 1924) (asserting 
that "fundamental principles of international law" may "invalidate[], or at least render voidable," 
conflicting international agreements); I LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 528 (1905). 
10. For example, in the 1934 Oscar Chinn Case, Judge Schiicking's influential dissent stated 
that neither an international court nor an arbitral tribunal should apply a treaty provision in contradiction 
to bonos mores. Oscar Chinn Case, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. AlB) No. 63, at 149-50 (Dec. 12) (Schiicking, J., 
dissenting). 
II. Von Verdross, supra note 5. 
12. /d. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
/d. at 574. 
/d. 
/d. 
!d. at 575. 
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any unifying moral consensus rising to the level of international jus cogens. 17 
These voices of resistance soon found themselves in the minority, however, as 
the jus cogens concept gained enhanced recognition and credibility following 
the Second World War. For a generation of international lawyers, the 
prosecution of Axis leaders at Nuremburg and Tokyo offered compelling 
evidence that international law did, indeed, impose substantive limits on the 
invocation of state sovereignty as a shield for officials accused of crimes 
against humanity. 18 During the same period when states were pledging 
allegiance to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and working to 
constrain state aggression and safeguard human dignity through consent-based 
multilateral instruments such as the United Nations Charter and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), international 
judges and scholars were declaring unequivocally that universal norms such as 
the prohibition against genocide would bind states irrespective of state 
consent. 19 
These two strands of the postwar human rights movement-multilateral 
conventions and peremptory norms-converged in a remarkable way during 
the 1950s and 1960s with the United Nations International Law Commission's 
(ILC) preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCL T). 20 
Early in the VCLT's drafting process, advocates for international jus cogens 
found a powerful advocate in the ILC's Special Rapporteur, Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht. In March 1953, Lauterpacht submitted for the ILC's 
consideration a partial draft convention on treaties which stated that "[a] 
treaty, or any of its provisions, is void if its performance involves an act which 
is illegal under international law and if it is declared so to be by the 
International Court of Justice."21 Acknowledging uncertainty over the scope 
and content of jus cogens, Lauterpacht asserted that peremptory norms 
derived their unique legal authority from two interrelated sources-
international morality and general principles of state practice. In Lauterpacht' s 
view, "overriding principles of international law," such as the suppression of 
slavery, "may be regarded as constituting principles of international public 
policy (ordre international public). These principles ... may be expressive of 
17. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 344 (1952) ("No clear 
answer ... can be found in the traditional theory of international law [to the question whether jus cogens 
norms exist]."); Georg Schwarzenberger, International Jus Cogens?, 43 TEX. L. REV. 455, 467 (I 965) 
("[I]ntemational law on the level of unorganized international society fails to bear out any claim for the 
existence of international jus cogens."); Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in 
International Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 55, 56 (1966) (discussing GAETANO MORELLI, NOZIONI 01 DIRITTO 
INTERNAZIONALE (NOTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS] 37 (3d ed. 195 I)). 
18. See LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 150 (1988) (surveying legal scholarship during 
the period 1945-69 and reporting that "about eighty per cent [of scholars] held the opinion that there are 
peremptory norms existing in international law"). 
19. See, e.g., Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28) ("[T]he principles underlying the 
[Genocide] Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, 
even without any conventional obligations."). 
20. VCL T, supra note 2. 
21. Hersch Lauterpacht, Law of Treaties: Report by Special Rapporteur, (1953]2 Y.B. Int'l L. 
rnmm'n QO Q~ I J N nn,. A/rN 4/t<;~ 
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rules of international morality so cogent that an international tribunal would 
consider them forming a part of those principles of law generally recognized 
by civilized nations which the ICJ is bound to apply [under] its Statute."22 By 
identifying jus cogens with public policy and general principles of municipal 
law, Lauterpacht hewed closely to Verdross's original concern for "immoral" 
treaties contrary to international public policy. 
Lauterpacht's colleagues on the ILC generally accepted his assessment 
that certain international norms had attained the status of jus co gens. 23 Yet 
despite general agreement over the existence of international jus cogens, the 
ILC was unable to reach a consensus regarding either the theoretical basis for 
peremptory norms ' legal authority or the proper criteria for identifying 
peremptory norms. Several ILC members embraced Lauterpacht's view that 
peremptory norms represented minimal rules of international morality 24 or 
were constitutive of "international public order." 25 Most ILC members, 
however, later joined Sir Humphrey Waldock, the ILC's fourth special 
rapporteur on treaty law, in seeking to reconcile jus cogens with the 
conventional positivist paradigm. According to Waldock's formulation, the 
content of peremptory international law must be ascertained from traditional 
sources reflecting state consent, whether customary or conventional.26 After 
an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC 
concluded ruefully in 1963 that "there is not as yet any generally accepted 
criterion by which to identify a general rule of international law as having the 
character of jus co gens. "27 
In the end, the ILC chose to open the VCL T for ratification without 
defining with specificity either the theoretical basis of jus cogens or the 
precise criteria for identifying particular peremptory norms. Article 53 
recognized the existence of international jus cogens by declaring that "[a] 
treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory 
22. /d. at 155; see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), 1993 J.C.J . 325, 440 (separate 
opinion of Judge Lauterpacht) ("The concept of jus cogens operates as a concept superior to both 
customary international law and treaty."). 
23. See HANNIKAINEN, supra note 18, at 160-61 (noting that none of the twenty five members 
of the ILC in 1963 denied the existence of jus cogens or contested the inclusion of an article on jus 
cogens in the VCLT); see, e.g. , Summary Records of the 877th Meeting, [1966)1 Y.B. lnt'l L. Comm'n 
227, 230-231, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/188 (noting that the "emergence of a rule of jus cogens banning 
aggressive war as an international crime" was evidence that international law contains "minimum 
requirement[s) for safeguarding the existence of the international community"). 
24. See, e.g., Summary Records of the 683rd Meeting, [1963]1 Y.B. lnt'l L. Comm'n 60, 63, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156 (arguing that jus cogens norms "must also be found necessary to international 
life and deeply rooted in the international conscience"). 
25. !d. at 65 (characterizing "United Nations policy ... as a value-oriented jurisprudence, 
directed towards the emergence of a public order in the international community under the rule of law" 
that embodies the values "of human dignity in a society dedicated to freedom and justice"). 
26. See, e.g., Reports of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1966]2 
Y.B. lnt ' l L. Comm'n 168, 248, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.l ("[A] modification of a rule of jus cogens 
would to-day most probably be effected through a general multilateral treaty . ... "). 
27. Second Report on the Law of Treaties, [1963]2 Y.B. lnt'l L. Comm'n I, 52, U.N. Doc. 
AICN.41156. 
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nann of general international law."28 In commentary accompanying the draft 
convention, the ILC indicated that "the prudent course seems to be to ... 
leave the full content of this rule to be worked out in State practice and in the 
jurisprudence of international tribunals."29 To this end, Article 53 stated by 
way of definition that "a peremptory norm of general international law is a 
nann accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent nonn of general international law having the 
same character."30 In short, while Article 53 affirmed the existence of jus 
cogens as a corpus of nonderogable international norms, it did not expressly 
ground these norms in principles of natural law, state consent, public order, or 
any other theory of legal obligation. 
During the VCL T' s ratification process, many states construed Article 
53's focus on "acceptance" and "recognition" as reflecting a consensus-based 
theory of jus cogens: international norms would not supersede conventional 
obligations unless recognized as nonderogable "by the international 
community of States as a whole." 31 This reading of Article 53 was not 
inevitable, however. While an international consensus might very well support 
a voluntarist theory of state consent,32 it could just as easily perform a purely 
evidentiary function in clarifying international public order or exposing 
fundamental ethical norms. Moreover, because Article 53 did not identify any 
particular international norms as nonderogable, states were free to speculate 
about the provision's scope and content. Aside from mentioning "the law of 
the Charter on the use of force" in commentary to Article 50 as "a 
conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character of jus 
cogens," 33 the ILC deliberately declined to enumerate specific peremptory 
norms in an effort to avoid "misunderstanding as to the position concerning 
other cases not mentioned in the article" and "prolonged study of matters 
which fall outside the scope of the present articles."34 In the end, therefore, the 
VCL T adopted the general concept of jus co gens without expressly codifying 
any of the competing foundational theories of peremptory norms in 
intemationallaw.3 
28. VCL T, supra note 2, art. 53; see also id. art. 64 ("If a new peremptory norm of general 
international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with the norm becomes void and 
terminates."). 
29. Second Report on the Law of Treaties, supra note 27, at 53. 
30. VCLT, supra note 2, art. 53 . 
31. See HANNIKAINEN, supra note 18, at 176; Gennady M. Danilenko, International Jus 
Co gens: Issues of Law-Making, 2 EuR. J. lNT'L L. 42, 53 ( 1991 ). 
32. See Shelton, supra note 3, at 300 (asserting that the VCL T "bases the identification of 
[peremptory norms] squarely in state consent"). 
33. Reports of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 26, at 
247 . 
34. /d. at 248. Most states evidently agreed that the ILC's mandate did not require a detailed 
examination of jus cogens and did not press the issue. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 18, at 178. 
35. States at the Vienna Conference disagreed, for example, as to whether peremptory norms 
would bind persistent objectors. See Danilenko, supra note 31, at 49-57 (chronicling these debates). 
Controversy over the scope and content of jus cogens persisted during the ILC's drafting of the 1986 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations. See Shelton, 
~unrn nnfP ~ ~• 100-01 
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The basic terms of the debate over peremptory norms have changed little 
since the VCL T entered into force in 1980. As then, the concept of 
international jus cogens today enjoys widespread acceptance among 
international publicists and has been discussed with approval by numerous 
international, regional, and municipal courts. 36 However, scholarly debates 
over the nature, scope, and content of peremptory norms--questions deferred 
during the ILC's deliberations-remain equally contentious today. 
B. Positivist Theories 
Most contemporary commentators continue to view jus cogens through 
the positivist prism of state consent. The requirement of state consent is 
justified on grounds that states are independently sovereign and autonomous, 
and therefore states cannot be bound by norms to which they have not 
consented. 37 According to the consent-based approach, international norms 
achieve peremptory status through the same sovereign lawmaking processes 
that generate ordinary international law. Specifically, states may consent to 
peremptory norms by codifying the norms in treaties, accepting them as 
customary international law, or employing them domestically as general 
principles of law.38 In theory, these traditional lawmaking modalities provide 
standardized processes for states to signal their consent to emerging norms, 
thereby enabling international actors to distinguish genuine peremptory norms 
from counterfeits. Upon closer inspection, however, none of these three 
lawmaking modalities forges an adequate link between jus cogens and state 
consent. 
The leading positivist theory of jus cogens conceives of peremptory 
norms as customary law that has attained peremptory status through state 
practice and opinio juris.39 The Restatement endorses this position, stating that 
jus cogens "is now widely accepted . . . as a principle of customary 
international law (albeit of higher status)."4° For positivists, a custom-based 
conception of jus cogens bolsters international law's legitimacy by ensuring 
that states maintain firm control over the generation and evolution of 
36. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(recognizing torture as a jus cogens violation); Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [2002) S.C.R. 3, 40-41, 2002 SCC I (Can.) (stating that the prohibition on torture "cannot 
be easily derogated from"); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Jurisdiction of the Court 
and Admissibility of the Application (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda) (Judgment of Feb. 3, 2006), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/126/10435.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2009) (recognizing 
genocide as a violation of jus cogens); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986I.C.J. 14, 100 (recognizing the prohibition on the use of force in international law 
as jus cogens). 
37. Danilenko, supra note 31, at 47; Schwarzenberger, supra note 17, at 457-60. 
38. See CHRISTOS L. ROZAKIS, THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 76 
(1976) (arguing that without evidence of state consent, "considerations such as the general nature of a 
rule, its moral, ethical, or constitutional status are insufficient to legitimize such a rule as a jus cogens 
norm"); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 118 (5th ed. 2008) (asserting "that only rules based 
on custom or treaties may form the foundation of jus cogens norms"). 
39. See, e.g., Michael Byers, Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Jus Cogens and Erga 
Omnes Rules, 66 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 211, 212 (1997) (arguing "that jus cogens rules are derived from 
the 'process of customary international law"') . 
.10 Rp;;;:TATS:UJ:'hlTfTt...non\nJ:'J;'()OJ:Ir.hlRJ:'J b.Tif""'N<;:.f"''J;TJ-U::'llhltTJ:nC::..TATJ:'C S. lf'l? n f, f1Q~7'\ 
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peremptory norms. When pressed, however, positivists struggle to reconcile 
this custom-based theory of jus co gens with actual state practice. States rarely 
(if ever) express an affirmative intent to transform ordinary customary norms 
into peremptory law, and it is unclear what forms of state practice (if any) 
would support an inference of implied intent. Indeed, critics of jus cogens are 
quick to point out that many human rights norms such as the prohibition 
against torture, which are widely accepted as jus cogens, are also widely 
violated in practice. 41 Even if state practice clearly supported recognizing 
peremptory norms as customary international law, the consent-based approach 
is hard-pressed to explain why customary norms would bind persistent 
objectors or nullify subsequent conflicting treaties. It is difficult, therefore, to 
dispute the assessment that "calling peremptory norms customary distorts the 
concept beyond recognition."42 
If jus cogens does not fit neatly within the rubric of customary 
international law, the notion that peremptory norms derive their nonderogable 
status from treaty instruments is less plausible still. The VCLT does not 
purport to codify any particular norms as jus cogens, nor does it purport to 
bind nonparties to its provisions regardless of consent. Other conventions such 
as the ICCPR and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) do incorporate fundamental 
human rights norms and aspire to universal membership. In the final analysis, 
however, state consent to these conventions cannot reasonably be construed to 
generate peremptory international law applicable to states that have not 
ratified them. The fact that many states have ratified the Genocide Convention 
does not obviate the need for nonsignatories to grant their consent in order for 
them to be bound by the Convention's specific provisions. Indeed, the notion 
that the Genocide Convention generates jus cogens through state consent is 
belied by the Convention itself, which states that parties "confirm that 
genocide ... is a crime under international law"43 and contains a denunciation 
clause permitting state withdrawal.44 This is not to say, of course, that the 
prohibition against genocide is not jus cogens or that there is no relation 
41. See ALEXANDER 0RAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 
(2006) (asserting that noncompliance with the peremptory norms against military aggression, torture, 
genocide, and slavery is too widespread to support the custom theory); Shelton, supra note 3, at 294 
("The asserted primacy of all human rights law has not been reflected in state practice."). 
42. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 41, at 114 (summarizing N.G. Onuf & Richard K. Birney, 
Peremptory Norms of International Law: Their Source, Function, and Future, 4 DENVER J. INT'L L. & 
PoL'Y 187, 193 (1974)); see also Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1149 (7th 
Cir. 200 I) ('"Customary international law ... rests on the consent of states.' ... In contrast, a state is 
bound by jus cogens norms even if it does not consent to their application.") (quoting Comm. of U.S. 
Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); Byers, supra note 39, at 222-
23 (recognizing that custom "is problematic as a source for jus cogens rules because .... States, if they 
choose, are ... able to create legal exceptions to such rules"). 
43. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. I, Dec. 9, 
I948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (hereinafter Genocide Convention] (emphasis added). 
44. /d. art. XIV; see also Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as 
Formulated by the International Law Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 946, 953 (1967) (noting that the 
nPnPV~ rnnVPntinnC: ~nrl nthPr mnJtibtPrnl hnrn~n riohtc;: l"'nnvPntfnnc: ~lc:n rnnt~in flpnnnri~tinn rf~IIC:Pd 
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between peremptory norms and treaties.45 What is clear, however, is that the 
mere fact that a multilateral convention codifies international norms is 
insufficient to identify the norms as peremptory. 
Another popular theory of jus cogens asserts that peremptory norms 
enter international law as "general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations."46 These general principles may include procedural maxims such as 
pacta sunt servanda, positivists argue, as well as basic individual rights 
enshrined in municipal constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions. For 
Verdross and Lauterpacht, general principles of law were compelling evidence 
of a transcendental morality tantamount to international public policy.47 In 
contrast, positivists infer that states implicitly consent to peremptory norms by 
honoring them as fundamental principles of municipallaw.48 As with custom 
and treaties, however, explicit or implicit state acceptance of general 
principles provides an unstable foundation for a positivist theory of jus 
cogens. Few general principles are truly universal across the international 
community, and the consent of some (or many) states does not explain why 
states that do not apply particular peremptory norms in their municipal legal 
systems should be deemed to consent to these norms as a matter of 
international law. Thus, some theory other than state consent must be 
employed to bridge the gap between general principles of law and jus co gens. 
Recognizing the asymmetries between traditional sources of 
international law and jus cogens, some scholars have suggested that the 
requirement of state consent might be satisfied if a representative 
supermajority of states accepted an emerging norm as peremptory. The ILC's 
Commentary to Article 53 appears sympathetic to this approach. Peremptory 
norms need not achieve universal acceptance to create a binding international 
consensus, the ILC opines; instead, international norms may claim a 
consensus of "the international community of States as a whole" if a "very 
large majority" of representative states accept the norms as nonderogable.49 
Circumventing actual state practice, advocates of this consensus theory 
typically presume that states signal their consent to peremptory norms through 
a variety of expressive acts, whether they be unilateral declarations by heads 
of state, diplomatic correspondence, or the simple failure to register a timely 
objection to emerging norms. Consensus theory thus envisions a new, 
45. To the contrary, the ICJ has held that the principles outlined in the Genocide Convention 
(as opposed to its specific provisions) are "universal" and "binding on States, even without any 
conventional obligation:· Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. IS, 23 (May 28). For an argument that human rights 
principles are universally binding domestically without legislative endorsement because they are 
universal, whereas implementing rules and regulations are not, see Alan Brudner, The Domestic 
Enforcement of International Covenants on Human Rights: A Theoretical Framework, 35 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 219 (1985). 
46. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945,59 Stat. 1031,33 
U.N.T.S. 993. 
47. 
48. 
this tension). 
See Lauterpacht, supra note 21, at ISS; von Verdross, supra note 5, at 573. 
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (6th ed. 2003) (noting 
49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 n.6 
(citing U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Report of the Proceedings of the Committee of the 
Whole. at 471-72. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/ll fMav 21. 1968) (comments of the chairman)). 
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autonomous mode of general international law formation-a quasi-customary 
source that is not beholden to state practice or individualized state consent. 5° 
The primary advantage of consensus theory over other positivist theories 
of jus cogens is that it liberates peremptory norms from customary 
international law's persistent objector rule. Yet to the extent that consensus 
theory continues to posit state consent as the foundation of jus cogens, it 
remains vulnerable to the same theoretical quandary that vexes positivist 
approaches to jus cogens generally, namely: why may a supermajority of 
states impose nonderogable duties on a dissenting minority? Those who 
embrace consensus theory tend to assume that states consent to the general 
process by which peremptory norms arise, even if they do not necessarily 
consent to particular norms generated in that process. At present, however, 
there is little evidence that states accept international consensus (or near 
consensus) as an authoritative process for generating peremptory norms. Even 
if states did consent to a consensus-based source of international lawmaking, 
the positivist paradigm would be ill-equipped to explain why states that 
disapprove of emerging peremptory norms in the future could not withdraw 
their consent at will.51 Thus, international consensus, like traditional sources 
of international law, is not particularly well suited to furnish the theoretical 
underpinnings of jus cogens. 
As many positivists have recognized, the very concept of jus cogens-
peremptory norms that bind states irrespective of state consent-is sharply at 
odds with the positivist account of international lawmaking. 52 If peremptory 
norms are to be taken seriously as a source of international obligation, their 
imperative force must derive from some principle other than state consent. 
C. Natural Law Theories 
One response to the inadequacy of positivist theories of jus cogens has 
been to embrace peremptory norms as remnants of the natural law tradition. 
Inspired by Lauterpacht's antipositivism, a number of commentators have 
argued that peremptory norms owe their privileged status to their imperative 
moral authority. For example, ILC member Mustafa Kamil Yaseen asserted 
during the VCLT's drafting process that "the only possible criterion" for 
distinguishing peremptory norms from ordinary conventional or customary 
50. See W. Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World 
Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, II EuR. J. INT'L L. 3, IS n.29 
(2000) ("In human rights discourse, jus cog ens has ... evolv[ ed] into a type of super-custom, based on 
trans-empirical sources and hence not requiring demonstration of practice as proof of its validity."); cf 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 l.C.J. 14, 99-100 
(June 27) (looking to opinio juris without considering actual state practice). But see Danilenko, supra 
note 31, at 48 (noting that at the Vienna Conference the representatives of France and other states 
expressly rejected the view that the VCL T contemplated a new source of law). 
51. See JERZY SZTUCKI, JUS COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
TREATIES: A CRITICAL REAPPRAISAL 97 ( 1974). 
52. See id. at 64 ("[T]he introduction of a consensual ingredient into the concept of jus cogens 
leads inevitably, in the ultimate instance, to the very negation of that concept."); cf Siderman de Blake 
v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that jus cogens norms "transcend .. . 
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norms "was the substance of the rule," includinf whether the norms were 
"deeply rooted in the international conscience."5 More recently, prominent 
human rights theorists such as Louis Henkin and Louis Sohn have suggested 
that jus cogens norms such as the prohibitions against slavery and military 
aggression derive their peremptory character from their inherent rational and 
moral authority rather than state consent; as such, treaties, custom, and general 
principles might recognize and incorporate peremptory norms, but they could 
not abrogate them. 54 Similar affirmations of jus cogens as natural law may be 
distilled from the jurisprudence of the ICJ 55 and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. 56 Although few international lawyers today 
share Vattel's confidence in a universal natural law of reason, many 
nonetheless agree that "[t]he character of certain norms makes it difficult to 
portray them as other than peremptory."57 
The conceptual challenges associated with natural law theory are well 
documented. Positivists argue that natural law theories of jus cogens 
artificially conflate law and morality, confusing parochial and relativistic 
ethical norms with objective principles of legal right and obligation. 58 
Although some peremptory norms such as the prohibitions against genocide 
and slavery are relatively uncontroversial across the international community 
of states, it is by no means clear how natural law theory would resolve 
disputes over the scope or content of less well-defined norms, such as the 
prohibition against torture, once jus cogens is uncoupled from state consent. 
More troubling still, natural law theory, like legal positivism, struggles to 
explain how peremptory norms can place substantive limits on state action 
without eviscerating the concept of state sovereignty. 59 For these and other 
reasons, most international courts and publicists of the last half-century have 
eschewed reliance on natural law in favor of other theories of jus cogens. 
53. Summary Records of the 683rd Meeting, supra note 24, at 63. 
54. LOUIS HENKIN, THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS 15 ( 1981 ); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of 
Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. I (1982) (citing the "natural law concept of rights, 
rights to which all human beings have been entitled since time immemorial and to which they will 
continue to be entitled as long as humanity survives"); see also Mark W. Janis, The Nature of Jus 
Cogens, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 359, 361 (1987) ("[The] distinctive character essence of jus cogens is such 
... as to blend the concept into traditional notions of natural law."). 
55. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 112 (describing certain norms of international humanitarian law 
as "elementary considerations of humanity" that "constitute intransgressible principles"). 
56. See, e.g., Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 62/02, 
OENSer.LN/11.117, doc. 5 rev. I ~ 49 (2003) (describing jus cogens as a "superior order of legal 
norms, which the laws of man or nations may not contravene[,] . .. rules which have been accepted . .. 
as being necessary to protect the public morality recognized by them") (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted); Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-
18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, at 95-96 (Sept. 17, 2003) (characterizing the principle of 
nondiscrimination as a jus co gens norm deriving "directly from the oneness of the human family and . .. 
linked to the essential dignity of the individual") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
57. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 41 , at 108. 
58. See, e.g., A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as Illustrated 
by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. I, 30 (1995) (arguing that natural law "risks 
falling into the error of assuming that, if it would be a good thing for subjects of a legal system to refrain 
from particular behavior, it must make sense to render the behavior illegal"). 
59. See Anthony D ' Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea 
fnr rhnn<>P nfPnrnrli<>m.<. 2'i GA .liNT' ! . & COMP. 1 .. 47. 1\3-75 (1995-96) (discuss in!! this tension) . 
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D. Public Order Theories 
A third tradition in international legal theory defines jus cogens as public 
order nonns essential to the integrity of international law as a legal system. 
According to this theory, international law recognizes certain imperative 
nonns as hierarchically superior to ordinary conventional and customary law 
in order to promote the interests of the international community as a whole 
and preserve international Jaw's core values against fragmentation. In 
V erdross' s words, 
the law of civilized states ... demands the establishment of a juridical order guaranteeing 
the rational and moral coexistence of the members .... A truly realistic analysis of the 
law shows us that every positive juridical order has its roots in the ethics of a certain 
community, that it cannot be understood apart from its moral basis.60 
According to public order theories of jus cogens, all peremptory nonns serve 
one of two functions: they either safeguard the peaceful coexistence of states 
as a community or honor the international system's core nonnative 
commitments.61 
Insofar as public order theory envisions jus cogens violations as offenses 
against the international community as a whole, this approach places 
peremptory nonns in close proximity to erga omnes rules-offenses that give 
rise to generalized state standing. The ICJ famously endorsed the erga omnes 
concept in Barcelona Traction when it affinned states' responsibility to 
refrain from "acts of aggression, and of genocide," and to observe "the 
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, 
including protection from slavery and racial discrimination" and characterized 
these nonns as "obligations of a State to the international community as a 
whole." 62 While superficially appealing, the ICJ's attempt to frame 
peremptory nonns as duties owed by states to the international community as 
a whole poses significant conceptual difficulties of its own: In what sense 
does the international community suffer an injury when a state subjects its 
own nationals to slavery or racial discrimination? As the ICJ acknowledged in 
a different context, where fundamental human rights are at stake "one cannot 
speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States."63 By the same 
60. Von Verdross, supra note 5, at 574, 576. 
61. See, e.g., Summary Records of the 877th Meeting, supra note 23, at 230 ("The rules of jus 
cogens represented a minimum requirement for safeguarding the existence of the international 
community."); ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 41, at 46 ("The purpose of jus cogens is to safeguard the 
predominant and overriding interests and values of the international community as a whole .... "); 
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law: In the Light of a Recent 
Decision of the German Supreme Constillllional Court, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 511, 513 (1966) (quoting 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 7, 1965, 18 Entscheidungen 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 441 (448) (F.R.G.) (characterizing peremptory nonns as 
"legal rules .. . indispensable to the existence of the law of nations as an international legal order")). 
62. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Bel g. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33 (Feb. 5). 
63. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I 95 I I.C.J. I 5, 23 (May 28). Even assuming that each state has a concrete 
interest in preventing violence in a neighboring state from spilling over into its own territory, this 
interest would cover only a narrow subset of jus cogens violations and therefore would not furnish a 
satisfactorv 11eneral theorv of ius col?ens. 
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logic, it is unclear why the international community as a whole could claim a 
more particularized interest in intrastate human rights observance than either 
its constituent member states or the people who reside within them.64 
Public order theory's best response to this dilemma has been to recast 
peremptory norms as principles integral to the normative objectives of 
international law and constitutive of the international community itself. Myers 
McDougal, Harold Lasswell, Michael Reisman, and others have argued 
persuasively that jus cogens norms such as the prohibitions against acts of 
aggression and racial discrimination reflect international law's transformation 
into a purposeful global community of conscience dedicated to promoting 
human rights and the peaceful coexistence of states. 65 As evidence of this 
normative agenda, public order theorists point to instruments such as the 
Charter of the United Nations, which defines the United Nations's objectives 
to include the promotion of "international peace and security," "friend~ 
relations among nations," "human rights," and "fundamental freedoms." 6 
When one considers the international community's overwhelming acceptance 
of the United Nations's mission, the notion that peremptory norms constitute 
international public policy is not farfetched. 
At the same time, public order's insight that peremptory norms shape 
and define international law's normative agenda does not, in and of itself, 
yield a promising positive or prescriptive theory of jus cogens. Public order 
theory does not illuminate the normative basis of peremptory norms, nor does 
it clarify which particular international norms should be deemed peremptory. 
When confronting these critical questions concerning the nature and content 
of peremptory norms, advocates of public order theory either retreat to 
circular reasoning about peremptory norms' indispensability to international 
society or recycle arguments from legal positivism or natural law theory. 
Equally disconcerting, public order theory-like positivism and natural law 
theory-does not address the enduring paradox at the core of human rights 
discourse: international law's seemingly contradictory commitments to state 
sovereignty and individual dignity. To answer these critical questions, 
international legal theory must look beyond the alleged requirements of public 
order. 
* * * * 
In sum, jus cogens remains a popular concept in search of a viable 
theory. The prevailing accounts of peremptory norms' legal status are 
premised upon, and shaped by, normative political theories of consent, natural 
64. As discussed in Part V, the real problem with these public order theories is that they 
misidentify the beneficiary of jus cogens norms as the international community of states rather than 
individuals. See infra text accompanying notes 188-191. 
65. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 3-6 
(1980); W. Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, The New Haven School: A 
Brief Introduction, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 575, 576 (2007). 
66. U.N. Charter art. I, paras. 1-3; see also HANNIKAINEN, supra note 18, at 5 (explaining 
that, in discerning jus cogens, "at present it can be said that the United Nations ... acts on behalf of 'the 
international community of States as a whole'" (citing U.N. Charter art. 53)). 
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law, and international order-none of which has proven adequate to the task. 
While the ICJ recently endorsed the jus cogens concept for the first time in its 
2006 Judgment on Preliminary Objections in Armed Activities on the Territory 
of the Congo (Congo v. Rwanda), it declined to clarify jus cogens's legal 
status or to specify any criteria for identifying peremptory norms.67 Current 
scholarly commentary on jus cogens continues to reenact the ILC debates of 
the 1950s and 1960s without resolving the two fundamental questions with 
which we started: First, what is the normative basis of jus cogens? Second, 
what is the relationship between jus cogens and state sovereignty? Taken 
together, these threshold questions demarcate a zone of theoretical 
indeterminacy that international legal scholars have variously dubbed the 
"conceptual aporia"68 or "mystery"69 of jus co gens. 
International law's perennial anxiety over jus cogens has real-world 
costs. Over time, legal scholars have generated conflicting catalogues of 
peremptory norms, fueling skepticism about the jus cogens concept itself. 70 As 
Dinah Shelton has demonstrated in a recent study, concerns about jus co gens's 
uncertain basis and uneasy coexistence with state sovereignty have diminished 
the concept's influence in transnational dispute resolution. 71 In some 
municipal cases, courts have declined to recognize international norms as 
peremptory while expressing doubt about the proper criteria for identifying jus 
co gens. 72 In other cases, national courts have accepted international norms as 
peremptory, but have hesitated to enforce these norms for fear that they might 
thereby compromise state sovereignty. 73 International tribunals have also 
hesitated to apply peremptory norms in appropriate cases. In Congo v. 
Rwanda, for example, Judge ad hoc John Dugard observed that the ICJ had 
refrained from invoking the jus cogens concept in several previous cases 
67. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Jurisdiction of the Court and 
Admissibility of the Application (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda) (Judgment of Feb. 3, 2006), at 31-32, 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/126/10435.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2009). 
68. Paul W. Kahn, Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New 
International Order, I CHI. J. INT'L L. I, II (2000). 
69. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 {2002); see also IAN 
SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 224 {2d ed. 1984) ("The mystery of jus 
cogens remains a mystery."). 
70. See, e.g., HANNIKAINEN, supra note 18 (identifying various broad categories of jus cogens, 
including "the prohibition of aggressive armed force between States," "basic human rights," "order and 
viability of sea, air, and space areas outside national jurisdiction," and "the law of war"); Maljorie M. 
Whiteman, Jus Cogens in International Law, with a Projected List, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 609, 625-
26 ( 1977) (listing twenty categories, including piracy, political terrorism, and disruption of international 
communications). See generally A. Mark Weisburd, American Judges and International Law, 36 YAND. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1475, 1493 (2003) (noting that state delegations at the Vienna Conference "offered 
widely differing lists of rules meeting the requirements of jus cogens; of the twenty-six delegations ... 
no more than thirteen agreed with respect to any one rule"). 
71. Shelton, supra note 3, at 305-17. Of course, one may take the view that the inadequacy of 
prior accounts of jus cogens reveals that the concept is indefensible and should be abandoned. The 
ubiquity and salience of jus cogens in international law, however, gives publicists reason to develop a 
more satisfactory account of peremptory law before giving up on the idea. The fiduciary theory 
defended in the text below is one such account. 
72. See, e.g., Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1149 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(expressing concern that jus cogens should be invoked "[o]nly as a last resort"). 
73. See, e.g., Bouzari v. Iran, (2004] 71 O.R.3d 675 (Can.) (holding that the prohibition 
against torture does not entail a right to a civil remedy enforceable in a foreign court). 
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where peremptory norms manifestly clashed with other principles of general 
international law. 74 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has 
addressed jus cogens only once, in Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, when it 
famously rejected the argument that jus cogens violations would deprive a 
state of sovereign immunity.75 Neither the U.N. Tribunal on the Law of the 
Sea nor the international claims tribunals for Iran or Iraq have ever mentioned 
jus cogens.76 In short, while the jus cogens concept has achieved widespread 
acceptance across the international community, its unsettled theoretical 
foundation has impeded its implementation and development. For jus cogens 
to achieve full legal standing, it will need to be reframed in a way that both 
illuminates its normative basis and explains its relationship to state 
sovereignty. 
III. THE NEW POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: FIDUCIARY STATES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In this Part we develop a theory of jus co gens norms that aims to explain 
both their peremptory status and relationship to state sovereignty. We argue 
that jus cogens norms are constitutive of a state's authority to exercise 
sovereign powers domestically and to claim sovereign status as an 
international legal actor. Our theory draws on the work of Immanuel Kant, but 
from an overlooked passage in the Doctrine of Right. In this passage, Kant 
concludes that parents owe their children fiduciary obligations on account of 
the innate right of humanity children possess as citizens of the world. While 
the theory we propose is Kantian, however, it is not Kant's per se, as Kant's 
theory of international law ultimately relies on his social contract theory of the 
state. Rather, the theory we defend is that the state and its institutions are 
fiduciaries of the people subject to state power, and therefore a state's claim to 
sovereignty, properly understood, relies on its fulfillment of a multifaceted 
and overarching fiduciary obligation to respect the agency and dignity of the 
people subject to state power. One of the requirements of this obligation-
perhaps the main requirement-is compliance with jus cogens. Put another 
way, a fiduciary principle governs the relationship between the state and its 
people, and this principle requires the state to comply with peremptory norms. 
Our theory aims to avoid the positivist's reliance on state consent by 
showing that peremptory norms arise from a state-subject fiduciary 
relationship rather than from state consent. 77 On the fiduciary theory, 
74. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda) 
(Judgment of Feb. 3, 2006), at 2 (dissenting opinion of Judge Dugard), available at http://www.icj 
-cij.org/docket/files/126/10449.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2009) (citing Arrest Warrant of Apr. II, 2000 
(Dem. Rep. of Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14)); East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 
(June 30); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 
16 (June 21); Shelton, supra note 3, at 308-09. 
75. Shelton, supra note 3, at 309 (discussing AI-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 79, ~ 61). 
76. /d. 
77. As will become clear below, the fiduciary theory implies that states have cosmopolitan 
obligations to foreign nationals affected by the state's power, including those outside the state's 
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arguments about whether consensus or a supramajority are required for a jus 
cogens norm to emerge are misplaced, since they all begin from the false 
premise of state consent. Similarly, the fiduciary view overcomes the 
difficulty public order theories face as they seek to justify jus cogens norms 
protective of human rights. Because these theories take interstate relationships 
as their primary focus, they struggle to illuminate the legal significance of 
peremptory human rights which govern the state-subject relationship. The 
fiduciary theory, on the other hand, starts with the state-subject relationship, 
and therefore is well situated to explain the inclusion of fundamental human 
rights within jus cogens. 
The fiduciary view also moves beyond natural law accounts of jus 
cogens which depend on vague notions of "the international conscience"7 or 
a "superior order of legal norms."79 While the fiduciary theory, as we shall 
see, relies explicitly on a moral idea of dignity, its reliance is not on dignity in 
the abstract, but on the legal significance of dignity within the juridically 
secure confines of a full-blooded legal relationship--the state-subject 
fiduciary relationship. Jus cogens norms flow from this relationship, and 
thereby embody distinctive norms that structure the very relationship that is 
constitutive of state sovereignty. 80 Thus, the fiduciary model promises to 
reconcile jus cogens with sovereignty, and through a principled legal 
framework that helps to illuminate the nature of both. 
We develop the fiduciary model in several stages, beginning with an 
account of the circumstances that give rise to fiduciary relations, an historical 
overview of international law's prior use of the fiduciary concept, and the 
argument that the state is a fiduciary of its people. With these pieces in place, 
we tum to Kant's explication of the moral basis of fiduciary relationships: the 
innate right of humanity of the person subject to fiduciary power. We 
illustrate the fiduciary model's ability to generate jus cogens norms using the 
prohibitions against slavery and discrimination as examples. 81 We then 
explain how jus cogens norms, under the fiduciary theory, are constitutive of 
sovereignty from the vantage point of both domestic and international law. 
territory. For convenience, we will generally refer to the "state-subject fiduciary relationship" as the 
locus of jus cogens, but it is important to note that "state-subject" denotes a wider class of relations than 
"state-citizen." The state-subject fiduciary relationship denotes a fiduciary and therefore legal 
relationship between the state and any person affected by state action, regardless of civil or political 
status. 
78. Summary Records of the 683rd Meeting, supra note 24, at 63 (comments of ILC member 
Mustafa Kamil Yaseen). 
79. Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 62/02, 
OEA/Ser.LNIJI.I17, doc. 5 rev. I ~ 49 (2003). 
80. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International 
Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866 ( 1990). Reisman argues that we are now in a period of a "new constitutive, 
human rights-based conception of popular sovereignty," but he does not explain why or in what sense 
human rights are constitutive of sovereignty. /d. at 870. The fiduciary theory aims at such an 
explanation. While the fiduciary account is a natural law theory in the sense that it trades on Kant's idea 
of an innate right of humanity, we shall see that it does not insist from the outset, as natural law theories 
usually do, on the preeminence of substantive natural rights or deeply cherished norms (e.g., freedom 
from slavery). Rather, peremptory norms flow from the conjunction of a Kantian understanding of 
dignity and the fiduciary position ofthe state vis-a-vis the agent subject to state power. 
81. We aoolv the model to other candidate oeremotorv norms. See infra Part IV. 
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Exercises of state power that violate jus cogens are prohibited under 
international law precisely because they are inimical to the fiduciary principle 
that governs state-subject relations. Finally, we argue that the fiduciary theory 
of the state is preferable to Kant's own social contract theory, and provides a 
better foundation for peremptory norms that constitute and constrain state 
sovereignty. 
A. Fiduciary Relationships and the State as Fiduciary 
Familiar fiduciary relationships include the following: trustee-
beneficiary, agent-principal, director/officer-corporation, lawyer-client, 
doctor-patient, partner-partnership, joint venturer-joint venture, parent-child, 
and guardian-ward. Fiduciary relations arise from circumstances in which one 
party (the fiduciary) holds discretionary power of an administrative nature 
over the legal or practical interests of another party (the beneficiary), and the 
beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to the fiduciary's power in the sense that 
she is unable, either as a matter of fact or law, to exercise the entrusted 
power.82 
Discretionary power of an administrative nature is other-regarding, 
purposive, and institutional. It is other-regarding in the straightforward sense 
that it is not self-regarding. A business owner's administrative power over her 
solely-owned business is not other-regarding, whereas a partner's 
administrative power over a partnership is. The fiduciary's power is purposive 
in that it is held or conferred for limited purposes, such as furthering 
exclusively the equitable interests of a trust's beneficiary. And finally, the 
power is institutional in that it must be situated within a legally permissible 
institution, such as the family or the corporation, but not, for example, within 
a kidnapping ring. Although the kidnapper is subject to some fiduciary-like 
obligations that mimic parental duties, such as a duty to provide food, the 
kidnapper is not a lawful fiduciary because kidnapping is irremediably 
unlawful. The law seeks to dissolve rather than regulate relationships of 
incorrigible domination. 
Beneficiaries are peculiarly vulnerable in that, once in a fiduciary 
relationship, they generally are unable to protect themselves or their entrusted 
interests against an abuse of fiduciary power. In many fiduciary relationships 
of private law (e.g., lawyer-client, doctor-patient, agent-principal), the 
fiduciary is a person to whom the beneficiary has turned for professional 
services or advice. The fiduciary is empowered to act on the beneficiary's 
behalf, and the things she is empowered to do for the beneficiary (e.g., defend 
a suit, tend an injury, sign a contract) are things the beneficiary is legally 
entitled to do for herself. In other fiduciary relationships, however, the 
beneficiary's vulnerability is of a different kind because the beneficiary 
82. One of us has defended this conception of fiduciary relationships, as well as a fiduciary 
conception of the state. See Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 
QUEEN'S L.J. 259 (2005). One of us has also argued that administrative law rests on fiduciary 
foundations. See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REv. 117 
(2006). 
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cannot in principle exercise the kind of power the fiduciary is entrusted to 
exercise. 
Children and wards of guardians, for example, lack legal capacity to act 
as autonomous adults. Artificial persons, such as corporations, cannot act 
except through their agents or representatives. But most interesting for present 
purposes are beneficiaries subject to a fiduciary power to which other 
beneficiaries are also subject, such as pension fund claimants with competing 
demands on the same fund. 83 In these cases, the contending beneficiaries are 
not entitled to exercise the fiduciary's power because no person can be judge 
and party to the same cause. As we shall see, mutatis mutandis, the same 
principle applies to private parties vis-a-vis the state and its sovereign powers. 
Although the hallmark fiduciary duty of a trustee to a discrete 
beneficiary is a duty of loyalty, the content of this duty necessarily changes if 
multiple classes of beneficiaries are subject to the same power. In these 
circumstances, the fiduciary duty necessarily becomes one of fairness or even-
handedness as between beneficiaries, and reasonableness in the sense that the 
fiduciary must have due regard for the distinct beneficiaries' separate 
interests. 84 In all cases the fundamental fiduciary duty is to exercise the 
entrusted power exclusively for the other-regarding purposes for which it is 
held or conferred. 
The idea that the state is in a fiduciary relationship with its people traces 
its origins to the republican idea of popular sovereignty that rose to 
prominence in the seventeeth century during the English Civil War, and is 
reflected in constitutional documents such as the 1776 Pennsylvania 
Declaration of Rights: "[A]ll power being ... derived from the people; 
therefore all officers of government, whether legislative or executive, are their 
trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to them."85 Long before the 
United States's struggle for independence, Locke had famously asserted that 
legislative power is "only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends" and that 
"there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the 
legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in 
them."86 In other words, popular sovereignty denotes that the state's sovereign 
powers belong to the people, and so those powers are held in trust by their 
rulers on condition that they be used for the people's benefit. Popular 
sovereignty thus implies that the state and its institutions are fiduciaries of the 
people, for their justification rests exclusively on the authority they enjoy to 
govern and serve the people. As we shall see, the fiduciary theory explains the 
state's legal authority to announce and enforce law for the benefit of the 
83. See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Hyman, [2002]1 A.C. 408 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
84. See id.; Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 245 (Can.); P.O. FINN, 
FIDUCIARY 0BLIGA TIONS 59-74 (1977). 
85. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. IV. For detailed exposition of the use of trust and fiduciary 
concepts in the historical development of public law, including international law, see Paul Finn, The 
Forgotten "Trust": The People and the State, in EQUITY ISSUES AND TRENDS 131 (Malcolm Cope ed., 
1995); and Jedediah Purdy & Kimberly Fielding, Sovereigns, Trustees, Guardians: Private-Law 
Concepts and the Limits of Legitimate State Power, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165 (2007). 
86. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL 
CiOVFRNMFNT (I 690)_ renrinted in SOCIAL CONTRACT ]_ 87 (Sir Ernest Barker ed __ 1948). 
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people, while simultaneously explaining limits intrinsic to state authority, 
such as peremptory norms. 
With the Peace of Westphalia and the emergence of autonomous states 
in the seventeenth century, the prevailing view of international order was that, 
as between European powers, there was no law, but rather a Hobbesian state 
of nature.87 Nonetheless, for more than 400 years these powers pressed the 
fiduciary theory of the state into ideological service as they sought to extend 
European sovereignty over non-Europeans and their lands. Spanish theologian 
Francisco de Vitoria, who generally defended the interests of indigenous 
peoples against Spanish conquest, claimed that indigenous peoples were 
essentially children incapable of self-government. Therefore, they were 
susceptible to a purportedly civilizing European trusteeship, albeit one that 
could exist only provisionally and for the benefit of the colonized peoples.88 
With a like sympathy for Indians subject to British rule, Edmund Burke 
deployed the fiduciary theory from within the colonial paradigm to argue that 
the East India Company had breached the trust-like authority Parliament had 
given it over India, and that the governing powers ceded to the Company 
therefore reverted back to Parliament (not to India).89 
In the interwar period, the Mandate System established by the League of 
Nations formally entrenched the colonial trusteeship ideas of Vitoria and 
Burke. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations stipulated in part 
that the mandate states (former territories of Germany and the Ottoman 
Empire) were "not yet able to stand by themselves," and that their well-being 
fell to the League as a "sacred trust of civilization."90 The mandatories owed 
duties of good governance to both the international community (the League of 
Nations) and their subject wards, which in theory were to be groomed for self-
rule. Although the League of Nations eventually dissolved, the system 
continued in diminished form after World War II under the United Nations 
Trusteeship System and has on occasion supplied a means of redress to trust 
territories.91 
On balance, the historical record appears to suggest that fiduciary 
doctrine enabled colonialism by lending it a veneer of legality. Arguably, 
87. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 183-88 (Crawford B. Macpherson ed., Penguin 
English Library 1968) (1651) ("[I)n all times Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of 
their Independency, are in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators ... which is a 
posture of War."). 
88. See FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance 
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991). The historical discussion in this paragraph is indebted to Purdy & 
Fielding, supra note 85, at 180-210. 
89. See David Bromwich, Introduction to EDMUND BURKE, ON EMPIRE, LIBERTY, AND 
REFORM: SPEECHES AND LETTERS 1-39 (David Bromwich ed., 2000) (hereinafter ON EMPIRE); EDMUND 
BURKE, SPEECH ON FOX'S EAST INDIA BILL (1783), reprinted in ON EMPIRE, supra, at 286. 
90. League of Nations Covenant art. 22, para. I . 
91. In 1989, Nauru, a Micronesian island and trust territory under Australia' s administration, 
claimed before the ICJ that Australia had engaged in self-dealing by managing the island's phosphate 
deposits for the benefit of Australia rather than Nauru. Australia eventually settled with Nauru, paying 
an amount that included Nauru's claim to the loss it suffered as a consequence of Australia 's self-
dealing. See Ramon E. Reyes Jr., Nauru v. Australia: The International Fiduciary Duty and the 
Settlement of Nauru's Claims for Rehabilitation of Its Phosphate Lands, 16 N.Y.L SCH. 1. INT'L & 
COMP. L. I (1996). 
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however, the wrongfulness of colonialism lies not in the trust-like structure of 
colonial rule per se, but in colonialism itself, i.e., in the prior denial of the 
colonized peoples' ability to govern themselves. In a postcolonial world in 
which the fiduciary theory is wedded inextricably to popular sovereignty, the 
theory underscores rather than subverts the idea that public power ultimately 
belongs to the people. Disabused of its colonial past and already open to a 
fiduciary vision of public authority, international law may now be ready to 
make good on the democratic and republican promise of popular sovereignty 
that the fiduciary conception of the state makes possible. 
The argument for the idea that the state is a fiduciary of the people 
subject to its powers draws on the general constitutive features of fiduciary 
relationships referred to at the beginning of this Section-namely, 
discretionary power of an administrative nature and vulnerability. The state's 
legislative, judicial, and executive branches all assume discretionary power of 
an administrative nature over the people affected by its power. For example, 
the state assumes discretionary authority to announce and enforce law over 
everyone within its jurisdiction. The legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers entailed by sovereignty, in their own familiar ways, exhibit the 
institutional, purpose-laden, and other-regarding characteristics that constitute 
administration. Moreover, legal subjects, as private parties, are not entitled to 
exercise public powers. For this reason, legal subjects are peculiarly 
vulnerable to public authority, notwithstanding their ability within 
democracies to participate in democratic processes and assume public offices. 
It follows that the state's sovereign powers--discretionary powers of an 
administrative nature that private parties are not entitled to exercise-give rise 
to a fiduciary obligation. 
We argue that the minimal substantive content of the state's fiduciary 
obligation is compliance with jus cogens, an obligation that remains in place 
whether or not the state has ratified a convention that signals a commitment to 
such norms.92 To apprehend the normative basis of this obligation, however, 
we need to have in view a general theory of fiduciary relations, one that sets 
out the moral basis of the beneficiary's right to the fiduciary's duty. 
B. Kant's Model of Fiduciary Relations 
Kant sets out the requisite moral basis for fiduciary obligation in an 
argument concerning the duties that parents owe their children, duties that 
arise as a consequence of a particular unilateral undertaking on the part of the 
parents: 
[C]hildren, as persons, have by their procreation an original innate (not acquired) right to 
the care of their parents until they are able to look after themselves, and they have this 
right directly on the basis of principle (lege), that is, without any special act being 
required to establish this right. 
92. E.g., Prosecutor v. FurundZija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, "ijl53 
(Dec. I 0, I 998) (observing that the prohibition against torture is peremptory based on "the importance 
nf' thP uo:~hu::oco 1t nrntea .... tco" r::tthea.- th~n C"i""'tQo l"'nnl:"a.nt) 
HeinOnline  -- 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 353 2009
2009] A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Co gens 
For the offspring is a person, and it is impossible to form a concept of the 
production of a being endowed with freedom through a physical operation. So from a 
practical point of view it is a quite correct and even necessary Idea to regard the act of 
procreation as one by which we have brought a person into the world without his consent 
and on our own initiative, for which deed the parents incur an obligation to make the 
child content with his condition so far as they can. They cannot destroy their child as if he 
were something they had made (since a being endowed with freedom cannot be a product 
of this kind) or as if he were their property, nor can they even just abandon him to 
chance, since they have brought not merely a worldly being but a citizen of the world into 
a condition which cannot now be indifferent to them even just according to concepts of 
Right.93 
353 
To understand Kant's argument, we need to review briefly some of the 
central features of his theory of right, which includes a very specific 
conception of the idea of innate right. For Kant, legal rights embody our moral 
capacity for putting others under legal obligations.94 Kant refers to property 
and contractual entitlements as acquired rights, because some act is required 
on the part of the right-holder for her to acquire them. An innate right, on the 
other hand, "is that which belongs to everyone by nature, independently of 
any act that would establish a right."95 All rights at private law, for Kant, are 
either innate or acquired. Moreover, persons have one, and only one, innate 
right, which each possesses equally by virtue of his shared humanity-that is, 
the right to as much freedom as can coexist with the freedom of everyone else. 
Freedom, Kant explains, is simply "independence from being constrained by 
another's choice." 96 More positively, freedom is the agent's capacity for 
rational self-determination. It follows that in a world where interaction with 
others is unavoidable, law must enshrine rights within a regime of equal 
freedom in which no party can unilaterally impose the terms of interaction on 
another. 
With these precepts in mind, consider Kant's claim that children have an 
innate and legal right to their parents' care. It is easy to see that the child's 
93. KANT, supra note 4, at 98-99 (footnote omitted). It is settled law in Canada that parents 
owe their children fiduciary duties. See M.(K.) v. M.(H.), [1992]3 S.C.R 6 (Can.). For an argument that 
U.S. family law should follow suit, see Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 
VA. L. REv. 240 I ( 1995). Other accounts of fiduciary relations are instrumental in that they emphasize 
the social utility of fiduciary relationships rather than the right of the beneficiary to the fiduciary's 
obligation. See. e.g., LEONARD ROTMAN, PARALLEL PATHS: FIDUCIARY DOCTRINE AND THE CROWN-
NATIVE RELATIONSHIP IN CANADA 152 (1996) ("[T]he law of fiduciaries is focused on a desire to 
preserve and protect the integrity of socially valuable or necessary relationships."). Yet other accounts 
explain fiduciary obligations as proxies for implied contractual terms. See, e.g., Michael Klausner, 
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757, 823 (1995). The Kantian 
theory is noninstrumental because its focus is exclusively the beneficiary's right to the fiduciary's 
obligation, and it is noncontractual because it governs relationships in which consent is in practice or in 
principle unattainable. All accounts, however, take seriously the protection of the beneficiary from an 
abuse of power. 
94. KANT, supra note 4, at 63. For clarity, Kant's discussion of rights summarized in the text 
refers exclusively to coercively enforceable legal rights and their correlative legal obligations. Kant is 
not referring to unenforceable ethical duties from his doctrine of virtue, such as the duty of beneficence. 
Those duties are unenforceable because no one has a right to call on the state to coerce their 
performance. Ethical duties, for Kant, arise solely from the categorical imperative (the ethical 
requirement to act only in accordance with universalizable principles) rather than from the rights of 
others. See id. at 42-43, 246-47. For a discussion of the intimate relationship in Kant between legality 
and coercion, see Arthur Ripstein, Authority and Coercion, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2 (2004). 
95. KANT, supra note 4, at 63. 
96. ld. 
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right cannot be an acquired right, since the child does nothing to acquire it. 
She is simply born. The part that needs further clarification is how the child's 
innate right to equal freedom can place the parents under a legal obligation. 
Although strangers have the same innate right to equal freedom as the child, 
parents owe them none of the special legal duties that they owe their children. 
To establish the necessary connection between parent and child, Kant 
points to the act of procreation, an act that brings a helpless and vulnerable 
child into the world without the child's consent. For Kant, the parent's 
obligation takes hold in the first instance because no party can unilaterally 
impose terms of interaction on another. When parents unilaterally create a 
person who cannot survive without their support, the child's innate moral 
capacity to place the parents under obligation is triggered to ensure the child's 
security. Parents' freedom to procreate can thus coexist with the child's right 
to security from the perils of a condition to which she never consented. The 
child is treated as a person worthy of respect in her own right, and not as a 
thing the parents can destroy or abandon. Kant defines a person as "a subject 
whose actions can be imputed to him.'m A thing, on the other hand, is "[a]ny 
object of free choice which itself lacks freedom," and thus a thing "is that to 
which nothing can be imputed."98 Put another way, the parents have brought 
into being a person who is a "citizen of the world," and one implication of 
citizenship in Kant's world of equal freedom is recognition and affirmation of 
the child-citizen's innate moral capacity to put her parents under obligation. 
As persons, children cannot be treated as mere means or objects of their 
parents' freedom to procreate. Rather, they are beings who by virtue of their 
moral personhood have dignity, and dignity proscribes regarding them as if 
they were things. By the same token, legal personality and the idea of dignity 
intrinsic to it supplies the moral basis of the beneficiary's right to the fiduciary 
obligation. A relationship in which the fiduciary has unilateral administrative 
power over the beneficiary's interests can be understood as a relationship 
mediated by law only if the fiduciary (like the parent) is precluded from 
exploiting his position to set unilaterally the terms of his relationship with the 
beneficiary. The fiduciary principle renders the beneficiary's entrusted 
interests immune to the fiduciary's appropriation because those interests, in 
the context of fiduciary relations, are treated as inviolate embodiments of the 
beneficiary's dignity as a person. In other words, the fiduciary principle 
authorizes the fiduciary to exercise power on the beneficiary's behalf, but 
subject to strict limitations arising from the beneficiary's vulnerability to the 
fiduciary's power and her intrinsic worth as a person. In the case of the state-
subject fiduciary relationship, these limitations include jus cogens norms, and 
as we argue now, their fiduciary basis explains both their juridical nature and 
peremptory status. 
97. /d. at 50. 
0!1 /A 
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C. Fiduciary States and the Prohibitions Against Slavery and 
Discrimination 
Kant's model of fiduciary relations provides a powerful framework for 
reconceptualizing both the state-subject relationship and the concept of jus 
cogens. Applying the fiduciary principle, states are no more at liberty to deny 
jus cogens than parents are at liberty to deny the fiduciary obligations that 
accompany parenthood. While of course a state's adult subjects are not 
children, and ought not to be treated like children, there is an important sense 
in which the state-subject relationship resembles parent-child relations: in 
both cases there is involuntary subjection to proclaimed authority. It is this 
common feature which explains w~ so many writers on state authority look 
to parental authority for inspiration. 9 As G.E.M. Anscombe puts it, with both 
parental and governmental authority, "[y]ou find yourself the subject of these 
whether you like it or not." 100 Thus, if the state, like the parent, is subject to 
fiduciary obligations, and if those obligations include the norms of jus co gens, 
then they bind the state peremptorily and independently of anything the state 
may do or say to deny them. 101 It follows that Article 53 of the VCL T's 
consensus-driven criterion for identifying peremptory norms is misguided, for 
it relies on the consent of "the international community of States as a 
whole."102 
A further corollary of the fiduciary model is that the whole of Article 53 
of the VCL T is superfluous. States are bound by jus co gens whether they have 
ratified the VCLT or not and irrespective of whether Article 53 has the status 
of customary international law. Therefore, even states that have not ratified 
the VCL T are barred from concluding treaties that violate peremptory norms. 
Article 53 makes no difference to states' obligation to refrain from entering 
treaties that violate jus cogens. 
To see by way of illustration how jus co gens norms might flow from the 
fiduciary model of the state, consider the peremptory prohibition against 
slavery. 103 Let us assume that there is a state-subject fiduciary relationship, 
and that the fiduciary principle authorizes the state to secure legal order on 
behalf of every agent subject to state power. At a minimum, establishing legal 
order on behalf of every agent entails that each must have the possibility of 
acquiring rights that can enshrine and protect his respective interests; 
otherwise, such interests would be entirely vulnerable to the power and 
99. See. e.g., HOBBES, supra note 87, at 253-55; JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 54, 
57, 86-87 (1986); G.E.M. Anscombe, On the Source of the Authority of the State, in AUTHORITY 142, 
148 (Joseph Razed., 1990). 
100. Anscombe, supra note 99, at 148. 
101. Tes6n deploys the parent-child analogy much as we are doing here, saying that "[j]ust as 
the parent's representation of the child is a function of the parent's respect for the rights of the child, so 
the government's representation of its citizens is a function of its observation of human rights." 
FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 85 (1988). 
Tes6n does not adopt the fiduciary model, but he comes close when he acknowledges that his 
"fundamental philosophical assumption" is the idea that "the reason for creating and maintaining states 
and governments is precisely to ensure the protection of the rights of the individuals." /d. at 112. 
102. VCLT, supra note 2, art. 53. 
103. One of us has developed an inchoate version of this argument. See Evan Fox-Decent, Is 
the Rule of Law Real/v Indifferent to Human Rif!hts?. 27 LAW & PHIL. 533 (2008). 
HeinOnline  -- 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 356 2009
356 THEY ALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Vol. 34: 331 
caprice of others. In other words, each agent must be treated as a person 
because each agent is an equally valid subject of the fiduciary authorisation of 
public authority. As a principle of legality, the fiduciary principle must treat 
like cases alike. 104 Thus, the fiduciary principle has no capacity to 
discriminate arbitrarily between agents who, in virtue of the state-subject 
fiduciary relationship, enjoy equal status vis-a-vis the state as co-beneficiaries 
ofthe fiduciary principle's authorization of public authority. 
Because slaves are denied the capacity to possess legal rights, a state that 
enforces slavery cannot claim to have secured legal order for the purpose of 
guaranteeing rights on behalf of each agent. It follows that if a state supports 
slavery, it does so in contravention of its most basic fiduciary obligation to 
ensure that each agent subject to its powers is regarded equally as a person 
capable of possessing legal rights. Since the fiduciary principle necessarily 
treats like cases alike and therefore regards every individual as an equal co-
beneficiary of legal order, the fiduciary state must provide for every 
individual's secure and equal freedom. As a consequence, the fiduciary state 
is duty-bound to protect every individual against all forms of arbitrary 
discrimination (such as apartheid), and not just slavery. Moreover, the duty is 
a binding legal duty, and thus juridical in nature, because fiduciary duties are 
legal duties. In Part IV we suggest how other jus cogens norms can be derived 
from or informed by the fiduciary model. But it is already apparent that the 
foundation of such norms is neither a full nor partial consensus among 
international actors, nor the consent of state parties as registered through 
treaty ratification or governance practices, nor the congeniality of such norms 
to the associative demands of comity and international public order. Instead, 
as we shall now see, the ultimate basis of jus cogens rests within the very 
concept that tends to be pitted against it: sovereignty. 
D. The Fiduciary Constitution of Sovereignty 
Sovereignty is traditionally understood in international law as the legal 
authority of a state to rule and represent a given population within a given 
territory. 105 As noted above, the fiduciary model respects the demands of 
popular sovereignty by acknowledging the people's dominion over the state's 
sovereign powers, and the resulting fiduciary position of the state vis-a-vis the 
people. A plausible political implication of combining the fiduciary model 
with popular sovereignty is democracy, since democracy permits the people to 
elect and dismiss those who wield state power. The novelty of the theory we 
104. H.L.A. Hart, the most influential contemporary defender of legal positivism, was prepared 
to admit this much: "[i]f we attach to a legal system the minimum meaning that it must consist of 
general rules ... this meaning connotes the principle of treating like cases alike." H.L.A. HART, 
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 81 
(1983). 
105. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 
(1987) ("Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent 
population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage 
in, formal relations with other such entities."); Patrick Macklem, What Is International Human Rights 
lnw? ThrPP Annlirnlinn~ nf n nift:trihutiuP Arrnunl "\J Mrl.u '. r. _T 'i7'i 'iRtl (?:007) 
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propose, however, is that the state-subject fiduciary relationship, properly 
understood, is a legal as well as a political relationship, and thus it has legal 
consequences, such as the emergence of peremptory norms constitutive of a 
new popular sovereignty. This conception of popular sovereignty is new in the 
sense that it yields specific legal obligations to which all states are subject 
strictly by virtue of the sovereign powers they possess. Consider now the 
relationship between this new popular sovereignty and international law's 
recognition of claims to sovereignty. 
Patrick Macklem argues compellingly that sovereignty does not simply 
exist, as a matter of brute fact, but rather international law distributes it to 
some legal actors (sovereign states) and not to others. For international as 
opposed to national law, sovereignty "comes from above, from international 
law itself," because international law alone can "shape an international 
political reality into an international legal order by determining the legality of 
multiple claims of sovereign power." 106 Macklem observes that, although 
international law does not recognize every plausible claim to sovereignty 
(e.g., the claims of indigenous peoples), it does protect the territorial integrity 
of "a state whose government represents the whole of its population within its 
territory consistent with principles of equality, nondiscrimination, and self-
determination."107 International law may also confer statehood on a "people" 
that has suffered protracted colonial rule, and likewise sovereignty may arise 
as a matter of international law if a sufficient number of states recognize the 
sovereign status of the claimant state. In short, Macklem contends that while 
international human rights law properly seeks to regulate the exercise of 
sovereign power, this body of law should also regulate the distribution of 
sovereign power with an eye to mitigating the historical injustices for which 
international law is partially to blame, such as the denial of sovereignty to 
. d" 1 168 m tgenous peop es. 
The fiduciary theory provides a unifying theoretical framework for 
sovereignty congenial to both the distributive and power-controlling projects 
of international human rights law. Just as the fiduciary principle governs the 
domestic exercise of sovereign power, it may also be thought to underlie the 
authority of international law to regulate the distribution of sovereignty, for in 
both cases the dignity of the people subject to sovereign power is at stake. We 
have seen already in the case of slavery that implicit within the fiduciary 
authorization of state power is a requirement that the state treat each person as 
an equal co-beneficiary of legal order. This requirement explains the leading 
criterion that Macklem identifies as regulating the distribution of 
sovereignty-namely, the principle that a government must represent "the 
whole of its population within its territory consistent with principles of 
equality, nondiscrimination, and self-determination." 109 Thus, the fiduciary 
principle provides a unified standard of authorization that permits critical 
106. Macklem, supra note 105, at 587-88. 
107. !d. at 586. 
I 08. !d. at 594. 
109. !d. at 586. 
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scrutiny and regulation of both the international distribution and domestic 
exercise of sovereign powers. 
E. Why Not Kant's Social Contract? 
Within the state-subject fiduciary relationship, jus cogens norms are 
constitutive of a new conception of popular sovereignty precisely because 
they embody legal limits on state power arising from the fiduciary principle. 
This fiduciary theory, we argue now, lays a better foundation for jus cogens 
(and human rights law generally) than Kant's social contract theory. 
Kant believed that the state derived its legitimacy from a contract that 
we each must be understood to make with each other to form a Rousseauian 
"general will." Through our agreement and the general will, Kant claimed, we 
jointly authorize the state to announce and enforce law. Kant did not think that 
people actually contracted with one another to set up the state through 
referenda or any other such means. 110 Rather, he claimed that we are under an 
obligation to agree to leave the state of nature to render our rights determinate 
and secure. Even on the rosy assumption of some mutual recognition of 
provisional rights in the state of nature, "when rights are in dispute (ius 
controversum ), there would be no judge competent to render a verdict having 
rightful force." 111 Individuals must therefore agree to enter civil society 
because, as Arthur Ripstein puts it, "they cannot object to being forced to 
accept those procedures [that would make right possible], because any 
objection would be nothing more than an assertion of the right to use force ... 
unilaterally." 112 
But we do not need to subscribe to a social contract to recognize the 
force of the principle that no one is entitled to impose terms unilaterally on 
others, and therefore that no one is entitled to be judge and party to the same 
cause. This principle of impartiality stands on its own, as Hobbes made clear 
in Leviathan almost 150 years before Kant. 113 Once the principle of 
impartiality is established, we can explain the need for the state, and given its 
fiduciary relationship to the people, we can explain its obligation to comply 
with jus cogens. Nothing is added by supposing that the people must consent 
110. Although Fernando Tes6n defends a Kantian view of international law, he appears to 
make the Lockean claim that state legitimacy rests on an actual "horizontal" contract between the 
people, as well as on an actual "vertical" contract between the people and the state's officials. 
FERNANDO R. TESON, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 57-58 {1998). One problem with this 
account is that both contracts are really fictions, so strictly speaking it is false. A. John Simmons has 
offered the most well-developed defense of the Lockean view (political voluntarism) that Tes6n 
espouses. Simmons aptly calls it "philosophical anarchism" because in no states do the conditions of 
universal and actual consent obtain. Thus, as he argues, a commitment to political voluntarism leads to 
the conclusion that all states in the world today, including liberal democracies, are illegitimate. See A. 
JOHN SIMMONS, JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON RIGHTS AND 0BLIGA TIONS I 03-12, 155-56 
(2001). 
Ill. KANT, supra note 4, at 124. 
112. Ripstein, supra note 94, at 33. 
113. See HOBBES, supra note 87, at Ill ("[A]s when there is a controversy in an account, the 
parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to 
whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided, 
.fnr n.T<:~nt nf' -:a rlnht 0&>-:ac-nn l"'nnC"tihltPrl h\1 N-:ah1r,_ "\ 
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to the state, since whether they must consent or not makes no difference to the 
state's authority and obligation to establish legal order on their behalf. It is 
enough that the state possesses irresistible administrative power over its 
subjects, that they depend on the state's proper exercise of its powers for the 
provision of legal order, and that they-as private parties-are not entitled to 
exercise public authority. With these assumptions in place, the fiduciary 
principle demands legal order of political sovereignty, a significant aspect of 
which is jus cogens. 
A final reason to prefer the fiduciary theory to the social contract 
account of the state relates to cosmopolitan citizenship, Kant's idea that an 
individual is a "citizen of the world" and therefore enjoys some rights vis-a-
vis all states. Kant's own view of cosmopolitan citizenship was somewhat 
thin: states owe strangers hospitality, a right of temporary passage. 114 Kant did 
not think that the original contract to form the state grounded cosmopolitan 
citizenship, and it is hard to imagine how it could, since members of states 
would lack privity of contract with nonmembers. The fiduciary theory of the 
state, however, lets us explain how jus cogens norms constitute a universal bill 
of cosmopolitan human rights. 115 On the fiduciary view, states owe every 
individual subject to state power a fiduciary obligation to respect their human 
rights because every agent so situated is peculiarly vulnerable to state power. 
The exercise of state power over vulnerable noncitizens engages the fiduciary 
principle because state power is always quintessentially fiduciary in nature; it 
is always purposeful, other-regarding, and institutional in character-and it 
retains this fiduciary character regardless of whether it is exercised over a 
citizen or a foreign national. As consequence, exercises of state power over 
noncitizens trigger a fiduciary obligation that requires the state to respect 
noncitizens' human rights. Thus, in the conduct of foreign affairs, states must 
respect the rights of nonsubjects enshrined under jus co gens. 
Of course, sovereign states are not the only entities that may assume the 
fiduciary obligations associated with public governance. In many areas of the 
world, nonstate actors have exercised powers of unilateral public 
administration comparable to the sovereign powers of conventional states. 
Examples include such varied institutions as the U.N. Interim Administration 
for East Timor, the Palestinian Authority, Hezbollah, and the State of New 
York. That the international community does not recognize these entities as 
full-fledged sovereign states does not render the fiduciary principle 
inapplicable to them, for it is an entity's assumption of state powers, not de 
jure statehood per se, that triggers the fiduciary principle. Any entity that 
assumes unilateral administrative power over individuals bears a fiduciary 
114. Kant derived the duty of hospitality from humankind's common possession of the earth's 
limited surface. Because the earth is a globe, individuals "cannot infinitely disperse and hence must 
finally tolerate the presence of each other." IMMANUEL KANT, TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795), reprinted in TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER WRITINGS ON 
POLITICS, PEACE AND HISTORY 67, 82-85 (Pauline Kleingold ed., David L. Colclasure trans., 2006). 
115. We elaborate some of the details and implications ofthis new conception of cosmopolitan 
citizenshio in Part V. infra. 
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obligation to honor the basic demands of dignity, including the peremptory 
f . . I. 116 norms o mternattona JUS cogens. 
In explaining the relationship between peremptory norms and state 
sovereignty, human rights advocates such as Reisman and Tes6n begin with 
the assumption that such rights are universal, and infer without much 
argument that all states must respect them. 117 The fiduciary theory provides a 
substantive argument that runs in just the opposite direction: all states by their 
very nature are in a fiduciary relationship with everyone subject to their 
power, and therefore all states must respect the human rights of their subjects. 
The universality of human rights is the conclusion rather than the premise of 
the fiduciary argument. The fiduciary theory thus explains the universal 
character of human rights through the universal obligation of states to respect 
them, aspects of human rights law that Tes6n and Reisman present as articles 
of faith. 
* * * * 
We have argued that the fiduciary model addresses the perceived tension 
between jus cogens and sovereignty by demonstrating that jus cogens norms 
are not exceptions to state sovereignty (as is often supposed) but constitutive 
of it. Others have suggested that human rights are constitutive of popular 
sovereignty (Reisman), or that claims to sovereignty in some way depend on 
respect for human rights (Tes6n), but the fiduciary theory offers the best 
account of why and how this is so. 
The fiduciary theory also avoids the problems that beset jus cogens 
under other accounts. Just as there is no need to pretend that sovereignty arises 
from the consent of the people, there is no need to pretend that jus cogens 
norms arise from state consent or interstate associational duties. Instead, 
peremptory norms in international law arise from the state-subject fiduciary 
relationship. It is time now to consider the general criteria for the specification 
of jus cogens norms that emerge from the fiduciary model and the extent to 
which currently accepted jus co gens norms satisfy these criteria. 
IV. FIDUCIARY STATES AND PEREMPTORY NORMS 
As we have seen, the international community has yet to settle on 
criteria capable of specifying peremptory norms. The fiduciary theory points 
to formal and substantive criteria that together establish an analytical 
framework of necessary and sufficient conditions capable of identifying such 
norms. We discuss these criteria immediately below. We then assess the main 
jus cogens norms presently recognized in light of the criteria that arise from 
the fiduciary model. We also specify some additional norms that ought to be 
recognized and discuss some contenders that should not. 
116. For ease of exposition, the remainder of this Article discusses peremptory norms as 
fiduciary constraints on state-subject relations, though the discussion generally applies with equal force 
to nonstate actors that exercise quasi-sovereign powers. 
I 17 .C::DP p 0 Tl='~tu~J ('llnrn nntP 1 In ::lt dO· RPic;;m::~n ('JJnrn nntP. RO 
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A. Criteria for IdentifYing Peremptory Norms 
Some of the fiduciary model's criteria for specifying peremptory norms 
are formal in that they condition the form such norms must adopt, while others 
are substantive in that they constitute the substantive aspect of peremptory 
norms which flow from the fiduciary position of the state. 
We begin by sketching seven formal criteria borrowed directly from Lon 
Fuller's internal morality of law, a set of desiderata that legal norms should 
aspire to satisfy irrespective of their substantive aims. 118 First, peremptory 
norms must embody general and universalizable principles as opposed to ad 
hoc and particularized commands. The fiduciary theory is a general theory of 
state legal authority, and thus its substantive principles can have only a 
general and potentially universal character. 
Second, peremptory norms must be public so that states, as fiduciary 
agents of their people, can know them and adjust their policies and actions 
accordingly. States cannot be expected to conform their behavior to secret 
norms. 
Third, compliance with jus cogens norms must be feasible in the sense 
that they cannot demand the impossible. States with entrenched poverty, for 
example, cannot be expected to alleviate such conditions in the very near 
term. States that permit or enforce slavery, on the other hand, can be required 
to eliminate it immediately (or as soon as humanly possible), since a slave 
state cannot under any interpretation by construed as a faithful fiduciary of its 
slave population. 
Fourth, the subject matter of the norm should be clear and unequivocal, 
since the point is to provide a public criterion of justice capable of guiding 
state action. The prohibition on slavery, for example, is clear and unequivocal, 
whereas a prohibition on exploitation, without more, is not. The fact that 
international standards such as the prohibitions against slavery, arbitrary 
killing, and torture require explication as applied to particular state acts does 
not render such norms insufficiently clear to guide state action. 119 
Fifth, peremptory norms should be internally consistent as well as 
consistent with the wider set of jus cogens norms. An inconsistent peremptory 
norm, or a norm that contradicts another, provides no guidance to the 
fiduciary state entrusted with securing legal order on behalf of its people. 
Article 53 of the VCLT (notwithstanding its superfluity under the fiduciary 
model) implicitly confirms this metaprinciple by stipulating that a peremptory 
norm can be modified only by a subsequent norm of the same character. This 
limitation on modification ensures that a set of internally coherent peremptory 
norms will always retain internal coherence. 
Sixth, jus cogens norms should be prospective rather than retroactive in 
nature, since states cannot go back in time to bring their actions into 
118. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33 (rev. ed. 1969). One of us has argued that 
Fuller's internal morality sits congenially with a fiduciary view of the state, and that this conception of 
public authority has substantive implications for human rights. See Fox-Decent, supra note 103, at 536. 
119. See FULLER, supra note 118, at 64 ("Sometimes the best way to achieve clarity is to take 
advantage of ... common sense standards of judgment .... A specious clarity can be more damaging 
th~n ;:m hnnest nnen-encierl va.Pneness. ")_ 
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conformity with the norm. This does not exclude the emergence of a 
peremptory norm that requires reparations for past wrongs, since the norm 
would still apply to the state prospectively by requiring it to provide a remedy 
at some point in the future. 
Finally, the set of peremptory norms should remain relatively stable over 
time so that states can plan their actions and implement policies within a 
relatively stable framework of international law. With respect to emerging 
norms, this means that attention should be paid to the effect their recognition 
would have on benevolent state policies that were innocently developed 
without taking the emerging norm into account. In practice, the stability 
criterion is unlikely to play a major role because, as we shall see, peremptory 
norms are immanent to the state's fiduciary obligation to secure legal order, 
and international law already recognizes a good number of them. But a 
concern for stability would rule out the theoretical possibility of replacing the 
currently accepted norms of jus co gens with an entirely different set. 
In summary, the formal criteria ensure that peremptory norms assume 
the form of general principles which provide public, feasible, clear, consistent, 
prospective, and stable guidance to fiduciary states entrusted to govern and 
represent their people. These criteria flow from the fiduciary conception of the 
state because they enable the state to act as a faithful fiduciary. Norms that 
flagrantly violate any of these principles would either frustrate the state's 
fiduciary mission or simply fail to enable it to establish legal order, and 
therefore they would lack any justification from the point of view of the 
fiduciary model. 
That the formal criteria are necessary does not mean that they constitute 
sufficient conditions for jus cogens. Strictly speaking, a norm such as 
"maximize the personal wealth of state officials" satisfies the formal criteria 
but would hardly warrant peremptory force. Nor are the formal criteria 
necessary in the strong sense that it is logically impossible for a jus cogens 
norm to exist if it infringes to any degree whatsoever one of the formal 
criteria. Peremptory norms will typically assume the general form of 
principles, and in some cases (e.g., torture) their precise meaning may be 
controversial. Moreover, they may satisfY the formal criteria without 
achieving a degree of clarity and determinacy that would prescribe the precise 
legal consequences of their violation. Considerations of this sort led Fuller to 
conclude that his internal morality of law was a morality of aspiration rather 
than strict legal duty, since the achievement of clarity or feasibility, for 
example, will typically be a matter of degree. 120 
The formal criteria establish necessary conditions in the weaker sense 
that a norm's flagrant infringement of any single criterion will undermine the 
norm's fiduciary justification by subverting the state's ability to comply with 
it. In other words, the formal criteria are necessary in the sense that they lay 
down formal desiderata with which peremptory norms must generally comply 
in order to meet the demands of the fiduciary model. 
120 ld at42-41 
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Further necessary conditions arise from substantive criteria that flow 
from the structure and content of the fiduciary model. Domestically, the 
fiduciary principle authorizes the state to secure legal order for the benefit of 
every agent subject to state power and, internationall~, the state is authorized 
to represent the people by acting as their agent. 1 1 In both contexts, the 
fiduciary principle's authorization of state power requires the state and its 
institutions to act for the good of the people rather than for the good of its 
officials or rulers. The fiduciary model's first substantive criterion for jus 
cogens is therefore a principle of integrity: peremptory norms must have as 
their object the good of the people rather than the good of the state's officials. 
This criterion eliminates formally adequate norms that would permit public 
officials to self-deal, such as "maximize the wealth of state officials." 
The second and third substantive criteria arise from the general content 
of the state's overarching fiduciary obligation to the people. Recall from Part 
III that the fiduciary state owes general duties of fairness and reasonableness 
to the people subject to its power. The duty of fairness governs the attitude of 
the state toward distinct individuals with competing claims on its institutions 
and resources. The fiduciary state must treat like cases alike, regarding each 
agent as a formally equal co-beneficiary of the legal order it is entrusted to 
secure. The second substantive criterion that bears on peremptory norms, then, 
is a principle of formal moral equality: peremptory norms must treat persons 
as moral equals. This principle is formal in the sense that it alone does not 
require any particular action of the state, but rather demands fairness as 
between individuals whenever the state does act. On a strict interpretation, 
state officials would satisfy this principle if they looked on and did nothing 
while an ocean liner sank with scores of their citizens aboard. They would 
violate the principle if they attempted rescue but their rescue efforts gave 
preference to certain racial or ethnic groups. 
The state's duty of reasonableness, however, would require its officials 
to make best efforts to rescue. The duty of reasonableness is akin to parental 
obligation in the sense that the state's attitude toward its subjects must be one 
of solicitude rather than indifference. The fiduciary state must have due and 
sensitive regard for the lawful and legitimate interests of its subjects. Thus, the 
third substantive criterion of jus cogens to emerge from the fiduciary model is 
a principle of solicitude: peremptory norms must be solicitous of the legal 
subject's legitimate interests. Whereas the principle of integrity prohibits self-
dealing on the part of officials, and the principle of formal moral equality 
requires even-handedness, the principle of solicitude demands that the state 
take seriously the legitimate interests of its subjects. 
These three substantive criteria arise directly from the substantive 
content of the fiduciary model and narrow the field of candidate jus cogens 
norms along familiar republican and democratic lines. Yet, like the formal 
criteria, they establish necessary rather than sufficient conditions of jus co gens 
because most or all human rights conform to them. Civil and political human 
121. For a discussion of the fiduciary implications of the state's agency at international law 
with respect to odious debt, see Jeff A. King, The Doctrine of Odious Debt in International Law: A 
Restatement (Jan. 21, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.cornlabstract=1027682. 
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rights from which derogation is possible, as well as economic, social, and 
cultural rights, fit commodiously within the analytical framework set out thus 
far. Freedom of expression and the right to work, for example, are specifiable 
in accordance with the formal criteria, have the good of the subject as their 
object, and are consistent with the principles of formal moral equality and 
solicitude. Hence, it may appear that the fiduciary model proves too much, 
and is too crude to distinguish jus cogens norms from other human rights, 
because it seems to imply respect for all human rights (or at least a very great 
number) and not merely peremptory norms. The problem is that the formal 
and substantive criteria enumerated thus far, even when taken collectively, do 
not provide a basis for distinguishing peremptory from nonperemptory norms. 
Now, all law presents itself as peremptory in the sense that compliance 
with it is mandatory. When publicists discuss jus cogens, however, what they 
really mean by peremptory is that such norms are mandatory and 
nonderogable irrespective of state consent. 122 While arguably the fiduciary 
model provides a principled basis for thinking that respect for all (or nearly 
all) human rights is mandatory, circumstances may justify restricting the 
scope or effect of certain rights and freedoms. For example, in many liberal 
democracies a prohibition on hate speech limits freedom of expression. 123 
Similarly, freedom of association does not include the freedom to associate for 
the purpose of a criminal conspiracy. Likewise, the right to privacy gives 
individuals security against search and seizure, but yields if there are 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the individual has committed 
a crime. Respect for freedom of expression, freedom of association, and the 
right to privacy is mandatory, but either the scope of these norms is 
determined in light of wider societal interests or the norms are subject to 
restrictions based on competing public concerns. 
In international law, the nonabsolute and derogable nature of these 
norms is reflected in instruments such as the ICCPR and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Each of these instruments allow state parties, 
under narrowly prescribed circumstances, to declare states of emergency 
during which the state may lawfully derogate from freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and the right to privacy. 124 Those same provisions that 
entitle states to declare states of emergency, however, prohibit states from 
derogating from norms of a jus cogens character, such as the prohibitions on 
arbitrary killing, slavery, and torture. 125 The fiduciary model, we argue now, 
122. See, e.g., VCLT, supra note 2, art. 53. 
123. See, e.g., Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 318-20 (1985) (prohibiting speech 
that advocates genocide or hatred against an identifiable group). 
124. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. 
E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174 [hereinafter ICCPR]; European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 233-34 [hereinafter 
European Convention]. 
125. See ICCPR, supra note 124, arts. 4-5. The travaux pniparatoires of the ICCPR and the 
European Convention reveal that the drafters carved out nonderogable rights with three considerations in 
mind: (I) the need to limit derogation strictly to national emergencies, such as lawful war; (2) the need 
to preserve states' ability to defend themselves in national emergencies; and (3) the desire to safeguard 
human dignity against grave abuses. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on 
Human Riuhts ~th Sess 110th mt<>. M 4-14 II N On~ F./C:N 4/SR 110 (fnlv I IQ~?)· FC:OSOC: 
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supplies criteria capable of distinguishing peremptory and nonderogable 
norms from other human rights. 
Whereas the three substantive criteria discussed above arise from the 
general character of the fiduciary principle's authorization of state power and 
the general content of the state's fiduciary obligation to the people (the duties 
of fairness and reasonableness), the substantive criteria relevant to the 
peremptory and nonderogable character of jus cogens flow from the specific 
content of that obligation: to wit, from the fiduciary obligation of the state to 
secure legal order. As discussed in Part III, the Kantian conception of legal 
order on which the fiduciary model relies consists in a regime of secure and 
equal freedom. Within this regime, persons must be treated as ends always, 
and not as mere means to achieve the ends of others or broader goals of social 
policy. Demanding that others live under the rule of law is consistent with 
digni~, but treating an individual as the mere instrument of another's ends is 
not. 12 
Dignity reflects the intrinsic value of agency, and sets limits on state 
action that respond proportionally to the threat such action poses to agency. 
Some state actions, such as genocide, arbitrary killing, and wars of aggression, 
may literally annihilate the agent. Others, such as slavery and apartheid, 
subject the agent to systemic domination. Policies of annihilation and 
systemic domination necessarily treat their victims as mere means, and aim 
deliberately at the extinguishment or ongoing domination of the victim's 
agency. They constitute a gross infringement of secure and equal freedom 
because they deny freedom's security from the outset. 
The proportional response of the Kantian fiduciary model is an absolute 
prohibition of such policies. The grave nature of the threat they pose to an 
Comm'n on Human Rights, 6th Sess., !95th mtg., ~~ 34-81, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.l95 (May 29, 1950) 
(discussing the appropriateness of using the concept of "war" in the covenant); ECOSOC, Comm'n on 
Human Rights, 6th Sess., !96th mtg., ~~ 5-26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.l96 (May 26, 1950) (discussing 
the articles that should be nonderogable in times of war); ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, 5th 
Sess., !26th mtg., at 3-9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR 126 (June 17, 1949) (discussion between the U.K. 
representative, Miss Bowie, and the USSR representative, Mr. Pavlov, and comments of the French 
representative, Mr. Cassin); ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, 5th Sess., !27th mtg., at 4-8, 12-13, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.I27 (June 14, 1949) (discussion centered around the concepts of "public 
emergency," "national security" and "war"); ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, 5th Sess., 88th mtg., 
at 13-14, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR 88 (May 19, 1949) (comments of Lebanon's representative, Mr. C. 
Malik); ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, International Covenant on Human Rights, United 
Kingdom: Proposals on Certain Articles, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/188 (May 16, 1949); ECOSOC, Comm'n 
on Human Rights, France: Proposed Draft of Article 4 of the International Covenant on Human Rights, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/187 (May 16, 1949); ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Draft International 
Covenant on Human Rights: Recapitulation of Amendments to Articles 2 and 4, at 2-4, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/319 (May 16, 1949); ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, International Covenant on Human 
Rights: Article 4: United States, Amended Proposal, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/170/Add.l (May 13, 1949). 
Under international law, the major difference between the nonderogable rights of the ICCPR and the 
European Convention, on the one hand, and jus cogens, on the other, is that the latter bind states to 
nonderogable norms irrespective of state consent. This is the principal characteristic of jus cogens that 
the fiduciary model seeks to illuminate. 
126. The conception of freedom on which we are relying echoes Philip Pettit's idea of freedom 
as nondomination, which is freedom from the arbitrary choices and power of others. Freedom as 
nondomination allows subjection to the rule of law, but proscribes subjection to even the most kind and 
generous of slave masters. See PHILIP PETIIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND 
GOVERNMENT(! 997). 
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individual's freedom is such that under no interpretation could they be viewed 
to serve her ends. Nor could their universalization ever be consistent with a 
regime of secure and equal freedom, since they annihilate or deny freedom 
rather than provide for its security. Nor may such policies be justified on 
grounds that they contribute to the collective good, for while in some sense 
they may do so, they necessarily regard their victims as mere means. 127 The 
fiduciary principle cannot authorize state action that irreparably or 
systemically victimizes some for the sake of others. In sum, policies that entail 
gross infringements of secure and equal freedom are deeply inconsistent with 
the state's fiduciary obligation to secure legal order. 
Therefore, the fourth substantive criterion of jus cogens is a principle of 
fundamental equal security: norms that are indispensable to the fundamental 
and equal security of individuals qualify as peremptory norms. Because the 
fiduciary state is under an obligation to guarantee fundamental and equal 
security, it is likewise under an obligation to respect the norms that are 
indispensable td it. And, because respect for such norms is indispensable to 
the state's performance of its fiduciary obligation to secure legal order, the 
state cannot derogate from them. Thus, the principle of fundamental equal 
security that flows from the fiduciary model lets us distinguish nonderogable 
from derogable norms, and thereby supplies a sufficient condition to the many 
necessary conditions that have preceded it. The principle supplies a sufficient 
but not a necessary condition because, as we shall see now, implicit within the 
state's obligation to secure legal order is another independently sufficient 
condition for the identification of peremptory norms: the rule oflaw. 
The constitution of legal order, as opposed to rule by naked force, has a 
number of immanent features that are united thematically under the concept of 
the rule of law. Fuller's internal morality of law is widely taken by positivists 
and antipositivists alike as the starting point of inquiry into the rule of law. 128 
As indicated, the formal criteria of jus cogens set out above are desiderata 
from the internal morality that Fuller thought legislation should aspire to 
achieve. To these he added the principle of legality, familiar to administrative 
lawyers, that official action must be congruent with declared law, thus 
127. In 2006 the Gennan Constitutional Court rendered a historic judgment that celebrates this 
principle. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 15, 2006, 115 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 118. Section 14 of the Air Safety Act 
purported to give the Minister of Defense authority to order the military to shoot down a hijacked 
airliner with innocent passengers aboard-but only if doing so were necessary to prevent the plane from 
being used against human targets. Notwithstanding this limitation, the Court struck down section 14, 
holding that the passengers' constitutional rights to life and human dignity precluded the state from 
granting the Minister legal power to kill innocent persons, even if such action would save a greater 
number of lives. For discussion of the case and its relevance to a fiduciary understanding of justification 
defenses within criminal law, see Malcolm Thorburn, The Constitution of Criminal Law: Justifications, 
Policing and the State's Fiduciary Duties, 2 CRJM. L. & PHIL. (forthcoming 2009), available at http:// 
law .queensu.calfaculty AndStaff/facultyProfiles/malcolmThorbum-1 /constitutionOfCriminalLaw .pdf. 
128. See, e.g., T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE OF 
LAW {200 I); JOSEPH RAz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW 
AND MORALITY 210 {1979); N.E. SIMMONDS, LAW AS A MORAL IDEA (2007); Paul Craig, Formal and 
Substantive Conceptions of the Rule or Law: An Analytical Framework, 1997 Pus. L. 467; Fox-Decent, 
.wnra note I 03: Andrei Marmor. The Rule of Law and Its Limits. 23 LAW & PHIL. I (2004). 
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ensuring that the rule of law prevails over the legally unauthorized rule of the 
rulers. 
Another theorist who provides an insightful catalogue of legal principles 
intended to be constitutive of legality or the rule of law is Thomas Hobbes. 
Although Hobbes is frequently referred to as the father of legal positivism and 
a defender of absolute sovereignty, he thought that the proper construction of 
legal order required fidelity to a series of determinate legal principles. 129 
These include the related ideas that no person may be judge and party to the 
same cause, and that all disputes must be submitted to an impartial arbitrator. 
Hobbes developed these principles into constraints on the constitution of 
judicial authority, claiming that judges are not free to decide matters 
arbitrarily and must exercise their adjudicative authority impartially. For 
example, judges cannot have an interest in the outcome of a dispute, and they 
must treat like cases in a like manner. 130 
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to articulate a comprehensive 
account of the rule of law, but if Hobbes and Fuller are correct to suggest that 
a body of fairly determinate legal principles is constitutive of legal order, then 
the fiduciary state must respect those principles (collectively, the rule of law), 
since its specific fiduciary obligation to its subjects is to secure legal order. 
Whereas the Kantian idea of secure and equal freedom establishes limits on 
state action that reflect the substantive demands of dignity within the fiduciary 
model (that is, peremptory human rights), the principles of legality identified 
by Hobbes and Fuller set out procedural constraints arising from the rule of 
law. 131 The fifth substantive criterion of jus cogens, then, is a procedural 
principle regarding the rule of law: a norm will count as jus cogens if respect 
for it is indispensable to the state's ability to secure legality for the benefit of 
all. As the ICCPR and the European Convention make clear, even in states of 
emergency in which the state's very existence as such is threatened, it cannot 
opt out of legality altogether. A state cannot jettison core components of the 
rule of law and maintain its fiduciary credentials, and thus those core 
components are sufficient conditions of peremptory norms. Some core 
components of the rule of law might include Fuller's principle that all state 
action must have a legal basis, judicial independence, impartial adjudication, 
and the principle that no one may be punished except in accordance with a 
previously declared penal law. 
Table 1 below provides a summary of the formal and substantive criteria 
we have discussed that comprise necessary and sufficient conditions for 
identifying jus cogens norms. These criteria are intended to provide merely a 
preliminary and illustrative framework that reflects the jus cogens 
requirements of the fiduciary model. Each of the substantive criteria in 
particular deserves far more elaboration than we have space to offer here, and 
129. HOBBES, supra note 87, at 189-217. 
130. For a discussion, see David Dyzenhaus, Hobbes and the Legitimacy of Law, 20 LAW & 
PHIL. 461 (200 I). 
131. We have no quarrel with readers who think that the rule of law, properly understood, 
includes the Kantian idea of secure and equal freedom and a commitment to human rights. Arguably it 
does, as one of us has argued elsewhere. See Fox-Decent, supra note 103. We separate the ideas here to 
hie:hlie:ht the distinctive. substantive asoects of the fiduciarv theorv. 
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there may be further distinct criteria that merit inclusion within the 
framework. But even as an inchoate starting point, the analytical framework 
that arises from the fiduciary theory provides a far clearer and more principled 
framework for inquiry into jus cogens than any of the positivist, natural law, 
or public order theories available today. Most significantly, the framework 
delivers on the promise of the fiduciary model to show how jus co gens norms 
can be both nonderogable and mandatory independently of state consent. 
Table I. Criteria for Specifying Peremptory Norms 
B. Recognized Peremptory Norms 
With the fiduciary theory's analytical framework in place, let us 
consider particular norms that claim jus cogens status. Over time, a number of 
commentators have attempted to catalogue peremptory norms, composing lists 
of varying length and content. 132 While none of these efforts has generated 
anything approaching a definitive statement on the scope of international jus 
cogens, the Restatement cited in the Introduction to this Article has become an 
influential reference point when discussing well-established peremptory 
norms. Recall that seven categories of norms appear in the Restatement as 
illustrations of international jus cogens: the prohibitions against genocide; 
slavery or slave trade; murder or disappearance of individuals; torture or other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary 
detention; systematic racial discrimination; and "the principles of the United 
Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force." 133 Tellingly, each of these well-
established international norms merits peremptory treatment under the 
fiduciary theory of jus co gens. 
As we have seen, the international norms against slavery and racial 
discrimination reflect the fiduciary theory's vision of persons as equal co-
132. See, e.g., HANNIKAINEN, supra note 18, at 315-23; Whiteman, supra note 70, at 625-26. 
11.1. DrC'TATC'-ACJo..JT /Turon\ ru::- l:nncrr:-.T Dl:."r ATII"\Jo..TC' nr -rur T h.11-rcn CTATCC' .1:. "if\") /I 00'1\ 
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beneficiaries of state action. When states fail to accord their subjects equal 
freedom under law, or otherwise engage in arbitrary discrimination, they 
contravene the basic fiduciary principle that furnishes the theoretical 
framework for state sovereignty itself. The international prohibitions against 
slavery and apartheid thus have peremptory force within international law 
precisely because a state's claim to sovereignty depends critically on its 
compliance with these demands of the fiduciary principle. States cannot 
support slavery or arbitrary discrimination without forfeiting their claim to 
exercise sovereignty on behalf of the people under their authority. 134 
The fiduciary principle's application, however, extends well beyond 
slavery and arbitrary discrimination. Other state practices that deny the innate 
moral dignity of individuals likewise violate states' nonderogable fiduciary 
obligations under international law. Just as states may not adopt laws that 
deny their beneficiaries equal rights and freedoms, they must forebear from 
exploiting their subjects as mere instruments of state policy or obstacles to the 
realization of state interests. At a minimum, the fiduciary model's criterion of 
equal security-the principle that a state may not exploit individuals as mere 
means to its own ends-limits state legislative and administrative power by 
l . r~ h .d 135 . . h . 136 out awmg grave o 1enses sue as genoct e, cnmes agamst umamty, 
summary executions, 137 torture, 138 forced disappearances, 139 and prolonged 
134. See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(advisory opinion) OC-18/03, at 100 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea _18 _ing.pdf ("[T)he fundamental principle of equality 
and non-discrimination ... belongs to the realm of jus cogens and is of a peremptory character .... "); 
Aloeboetoe Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 15, at 50,57 (Sept. 10, 1993) (recognizing slavery as a 
jus cogens violation). 
135. See Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 
(May 28) (accepting the prohibition against genocide as jus cogens); Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case No. 
IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ~ 639 (Jan. 17, 2005) ("It is widely recognised that ... the norm prohibiting 
genocide constitutes jus cogens."). Under the fiduciary model, the jus cogens prohibition against 
genocide would have a broader scope than under the Genocide Convention because it would proscribe 
genocidal acts not only against "a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" but also against groups 
based on political affiliation, gender, or other characteristics. Genocide Convention, supra note 43, art. 
II. 
136. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003) (characterizing crimes 
against humanity as jus cogens violations); Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 154, at 47 (Sept. 26, 2006) (finding that extrajudicial execution as part of a "generalized or 
systematic attack against certain sectors of the civil population" is a crime against humanity and violates 
jus cogens); Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 
Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment,~ 21 (Oct. 7, 1997) ("Because of their heinousness and magnitude, 
[crimes against humanity] constitute an egregious attack on human dignity, on the very notion of 
humaneness."). 
137. See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, "Simon, Julio Hector y otros sf 
privacion ilegitima de Ia libertad," Fallos (2005-328-2056) (Arg.) (striking down Argentina's amnesty 
laws as unconstitutional because they prevented Argentina from complying with the jus cogens norm 
against forced disappearances); Gomez Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
110, at 76 (July 8, 2004) (holding that extrajudicial executions violate jus cogens). 
138. See Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. II, 290 (2001) 
(recognizing that under the European Convention "the right ... not to be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment ... is an absolute right, permitting of no exception in 
any circumstances"); Prosecutor v. FurundZija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,~ 144 
(Dec. I 0, 1998) ("[T]he prohibition of torture laid down in human rights treaties enshrines an absolute 
right, which can never be derogated from, not even in time of emergency ... [because it] is a 
peremptory norm or jus cogens."). 
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arbitrary detention. 140 Such flagrant abuses of state power deny a state's 
beneficiaries secure and equal freedom and therefore trigger international 
law's strictest peremptory prohibitions. 
As discussed previously, however, the state-subject fiduciary relation is 
not limited to a state's interactions with its own nationals. Individuals are 
vulnerable to transnational state aggression just as they are vulnerable to 
intraterritorial aggression, and the same nonderogable legal and moral 
imperatives that govern the state-subject relationship apply with equal vigor to 
state abuses against foreign nationals. We shall have more to say in Part V 
about international law's growing recognition of dignity as a constraint on 
transnational state action. For present purposes it will suffice to observe that 
under the fiduciary model states can claim no greater license to engage in 
crimes against humanity against individuals outside their borders than against 
their own people. 141 All such abuses are inimical to the principle of secure and 
equal freedom under law, and so the fiduciary model helps to explain the 
cosmopolitan scope of jus cogens norms, in addition to explaining their 
content. 
The fiduciary theory thus confirms the conventional wisdom that certain 
grievous abuses of state power are universally prohibited as a matter of jus 
cogens. These mandatory and nonderogable norms do not owe their 
peremptory status to state consent; rather, they demarcate the outer limits of 
the fiduciary state's legal authority. 
C. Emerging Peremptory Norms 
Looking beyond the Restatement's well-recognized categories of jus 
cogens, the fiduciary theory's formal and substantive criteria provide a 
practical framework for identifying other peremptory norms. We now review 
briefly three norms that rarely attract attention in discussions of jus cogens, 
and yet qualify as peremptory under the fiduciary theory: the right to due 
process, the norm against public corruption, and the principle of self-
determination. 
Due Process. The fiduciary conception of state sovereignty demands 
that states afford all individuals the fundamental procedural protections of due 
process. International instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the ICCPR have long recognized that states must employ certain 
minimal procedures to safeguard human life and liberty from arbitrary 
deprivation, including the right to notice of criminal charges, an opportunity 
139. See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Mass. 1995) (classifying the 
prohibition against forced disappearances as a peremptory norm); Goiburu v. Paraguay, 2006 Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153, at 67 (Sept. 22, 2006) (characterizing the prohibitions against forced 
disappearances and torture as jus co gens). 
140. See Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (listing "prolonged arbitrary detention" among other jus cogens violations). 
141. For this reason, military aggression and grave war crimes-which are tantamount to 
crimes against humanity-violate jus cogens. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 J.C.J. 14, 100 (June 27) (describing the prohibition against military 
.,nn-r,pocC'inn -:toe ":1 "l"nncnif"tlniiC' PV!IrnniP nf -:to n1IP nf intPrn!ltinn!ll lo:~u1 ho:to"inn thP l"'ho::r.r!lf"h:•r nf i11C' l"'nnPnc"\ 
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to be heard and to £.resent evidence, and adjudication by an independent and 
impartial tribunal. 1 2 As international criminal law has matured over the past 
two decades, these fundamental due process norms have been codified as 
mandatory procedural rules for international criminal tribunals, 143 and a few 
scholars have asserted that due process should be recognized as a peremptory 
norm. 144 
The fiduciary theory strongly supports classifying due process as a 
peremptory norm. A state transgresses its general fiduciary duties of fairness 
and solicitude when it deprives individuals of life or liberty without 
employing decisionmaking procedures that are sufficiently robust to minimize 
the risk of a biased, arbitrary or otherwise unfair hearing. Indeed, however one 
defines the state's specific duty to promote public security under the rule of 
law, this duty must, at a minimum, require adherence to basic principles of 
procedural fairness. What due fsrocess demands in a particular proceeding will 
tum upon contextual factors, 1 5 though some basic features of a fair hearing 
are clearly indispensable in all cases, such as the need for an impartial 
adjudicator. These basic attributes of a fair hearing protect individuals against 
arbitrary or self-serving government action and are integral to the state's 
fiduciary obligation to secure the rule of law. As such, they cannot admit 
derogation even during national emergencies, lest the state abdicate its 
fundamental fiduciary role. 146 
Public Corruption. The international norm against state corruption has 
received even less attention as a candidate for peremptory status. 147 This 
oversight cannot be explained away on the grounds that public corruption is a 
142. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights arts. 10, II, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, 73, 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. N810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (proclaiming the right to a fair 
and public hearing in an independent and impartial tribunal, including the right to "all the guarantees 
necessary for [the accused's] defence"). 
143. See Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process 
Aspirations and Limitations, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 641-70 (2007) (chronicling these 
developments). 
144. See ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 41, at 60 (describing "due process" as a peremptory 
norm); Jenia lontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. I, 44 
n.253 (2005) (same). But see Michael Byers, Book Review, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 913, 916 (2007) 
(asserting that "due process guarantees and the right to a fair trial" are "derogable"). 
145. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (defining due process under the 
U.S. Constitution to require a multifactor balancing test); Charkaoui v. Canada, [2007) I S.C.R. 350, 
2007 SCC 9 (Can.) (while national security concerns can warrant less robust and open procedures, the 
right to a fair hearing remains intact). 
146. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008) ("The laws and Constitution are 
designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times."); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 
536 (2004) (holding that a U.S. citizen allegedly apprehended on the battlefield in Afghanistan was 
entitled to due process because "a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to 
the rights of the Nation's citizens"); DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A 
TIME OF EMERGENCY (2006) (arguing that the rule of law demands respect for procedural safeguards 
even if the executive has broad discretionary authority to detain individuals on national security 
grounds). 
147. A few scholars have argued that wide-scale public corruption should be considered an 
international crime against humanity, suggesting by implication that the norm should be treated as 
peremptory. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times: International Justice 
Beyond Crisis Situations, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1257, 1297 (2007) ("Given the massive suffering 
caused ... grand corruption seems to amount to a paradigmatic example of what should be considered 
an international crime'')_ 
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lesser evil than other grave abuses of state power. To cite but one example, 
human rights observers in Angola chronicled "the disappearance of over four 
billion dollars from the public coffers [between 1997 and 2002,] an amount 
'roughly equal to the total amount spent on the humanitarian, social, health, 
and education needs of a population in severe distress."' 148 Such brazen 
kleptocracy undermines the very governmental institutions that are charged 
with preserving legal order and jeopardizes the physical security and liberty of 
nationals who depend on government assistance for relief from violence, 
starvation, and disease. 
Viewed from the fiduciary theory's perspective, the international norm 
against public corruption merits peremptory authority within international 
law. The prohibition against self-dealing meets the fiduciary theory's 
substantive criteria by advancing the best interests of the people rather than 
state officials (integrity), refusing to privilege certain private interests over 
others arbitrarily (formal moral equality), and manifesting due regard for the 
interests of its beneficiaries (solicitude). The anticorruption norm also satisfies 
the specific substantive criteria because it requires the state to treat its national 
patrimony (e.g., tax revenue, resources, public services) as a public good to 
which every national has an equal claim under the rule of law and relevant 
municipal legislation. Like the prohibitions against summary execution and 
torture, the prohibition against corruption is necessary to ensure that the state 
regards its nationals as ends in themselves and never merely as the means for 
the ends of others. More broadly still, there can be no derogation from the 
norm against corruption because corruption is the antithesis of the other-
regarding mandate the fiduciary state enjoys to secure legal order. For these 
reasons, the fiduciary theory elevates the international norm against public 
corruption to the status of nonderogable jus co gens. 149 
Recognizing the norm against public corruption as a peremptory norm 
illuminates an important feature of jus cogens itself. Public corruption offends 
the state-subject fiduciary relation irrespective of whether the corrupt acts are 
large or small in scope: a low-level public official who steals a pittance or 
accepts a petty bribe violates the peremptory norm against corruption, just as a 
head of state violates jus co gens by draining the state treasury for private gain. 
The prohibition against corruption thus illustrates the important principle that 
the scope of jus cogens is not limited exclusively to acts such as military 
aggression or genocide that inflict harm on a massive scale. Violations of 
peremptory norms such as the prohibitions against corruption and torture are 
necessarily wrongful and legally impermissible on any scale. 
148. /d. at 1283 (quoting HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SOME TRANSPARENCY, No 
ACCOUNTABILITY: THE USE OF 0JL REVENUE IN ANGOLA AND ITS IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2004), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/enlreports/2004/0 1/ 12/some-transparency-no-accountability); see also 
Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and Collective Human 
Right: Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime Under International Law, 34 INT'L LAW. 149, 161-63 
(2000) (reviewing comparable examples of public corruption in Nigeria and the former Republic of 
Zaire). 
149. Note that recognition of public corruption as a peremptory norm arguably renders Article 
50 of the VCLT superfluous, since "the corruption of [a State's] representative" under Article 50 would 
ren<ler a treatv nrnvi<ion inv>~li<lnn<ler Arti~le 'i1 VCT T wnrn note 7 >~rt 'iO~ 
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Self-determination. Unlike due process and public corruption, the right 
to self-determination of peoples has attracted a great deal of attention and 
controversy as a potential peremptory norm. 150 Generally speaking, 
international law recognizes the right of peoples to full political participation 
and cultural identity within an independent and autonomous state that honors 
their fundamental rights and freedoms--even if, for various reasons, peoples 
might not succeed in acquiring independence from their state of residence. 151 
This general principle operates today along two dimensions: "external" self-
determination and "internal" self-determination. 152 External self-determination 
provides that national groups have a right to freedom from colonial 
domination-to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development."153 Where subnational groups are 
unable to break away from existing states to form new states of their own, 
they may still claim a right to internal self-determination, which requires, at a 
minimum, that they enjoy full and equal participation in the processes of 
representative self-governance. Although these general principles of self-
determination have yet to achieve universal acceptance among international 
publicists as full-fledged peremptory norms, 154 there seems to be a growing 
movement to seat self-determination within the ranks of jus cogens. 155 
The right to external self-determination flows naturally from the 
fiduciary foundations of state authority. As we have seen, a state cannot use 
force for the purpose of subjecting another state to its control without 
implicitly failing to treat foreign nationals as equal moral agents. By the same 
token, a group's claim to independence from external domination is a 
derivative of individuals' entitlement to secure and equal liberty as citizens of 
the world. Colonial domination frustrates the liberty of individuals to self-
organize into a political community governed by laws responsive to their 
interests. Like the prohibition against military aggression, the anticolonial 
right to external self-determination seeks to guarantee individuals' secure and 
equal freedom by providing for their self-rule. 
Internal self-determination has proven to be more politically and 
theoretically divisive than external self-determination, as it has been invoked 
150. See Karl Doehring, Self-Determination, in CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
COMMENTARY 62 (Bruno Simma et al. eds. , 2002) (describing the debate). 
151. See U.N. Charter art. I, para. 2; ICCPR, supra note 124, art. 1(1); Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 
Supp. No. 28, at 122, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) . 
152. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 67-140 
(1995). 
153. ICCPR, supra note 124, art. I (I). 
154. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (1979) 
(assening that the peremptory status of self-determination is "difficult to accept"); HANNIKAINEN, supra 
note 18, at 357 (expressing skepticism about internal self-determination). 
155. See U.N. lnt'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, an. 23, ~ 5 cmt., in Report of the International Law Commission to 
the General Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Oct. 30, 2001) 
(characterizing self-determination as jus cogens); cf Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 
l.C.J. 90, 213 (June 30) (characterizing the self-determination principle's erga omnes character as 
"irreproachable"). 
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in support of diverse subnational and transnational independence movements, 
as well as indigenous peoples' claims to political autonomy and control over 
resources. 
156 We need not canvass all of the possible conceptions or 
applications of internal self-determination, however, to recognize that certain 
norms commonly associated with the principle qualify as jus cogens under the 
fiduciary theory. At a minimum, a state cannot reasonably claim to honor its 
fiduciary obligations if it arbitrarily denies a discrete group of its nationals the 
opportunity to participate equally in national politics or withholds other 
critical rights or privileges of nationality. In addition, some municipal courts 
have held that states are in a fiduciary relationship with indigenous peoples, 
and that states must consult with indigenous peoples and seek to 
accommodate their concerns if proposed state action will infringe their 
rights. 157 International law also supports indigenous self-determination and a 
duty to consult. 158 Violation of these kinds of autonomy-enabling rights would 
breach obligations that many states now recognize as fiduciary in character. 
Insofar as the principle of internal self-determination addresses these or other 
constitutive concerns of the state-subject fiduciary relation, it deserves to be 
accorded peremptory force within international law. 
Much more work must be done, of course, to clarify the fiduciary 
theory's application to internal self-determination. The limited scope of this 
Article does not permit us to address whether other norms commonly 
associated with internal self-determination (for example, legal pluralism, 
linguistic and educational rights) would qualify as jus cogens under the 
fiduciary theory. Nor do we have space to set out the conditions under which 
certain remedies for state violations of internal self-determination would be 
preferable to others (for example, secession, federative autonomy, restoring 
civil and political rights, enhanced claims to resources to ensure cultural 
survival, duties to consult and accommodate). For present purposes, we 
observe simply that the fiduciary theory lends credence to the view that 
various norms that fall under the heading of internal self-determination qualify 
for peremptory status. 
156. See MORTON H. HALPERIN & DAVID J. SCHEFFER WITH PATRICIA L. SMALL, SELF-
DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 49-51 (1992) (discussing these and other contexts where 
internal self-determination has been invoked); Allan Rosas, Internal Self-determination, in MODERN 
LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 225, 228 (Christian Tomuschat ed., !993) (noting disagreement over the 
concept of internal self-determination). 
157. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942) ("In carrying out its 
treaty obligations with the Indian tribes the Government .... has charged itself with moral obligations 
of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct ... should therefore be judged by the most exacting 
fiduciary standards."); British Columbia v. Haida Nation (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 
(Can.) (finding that the Crown's duty to consult includes a duty to seek an accommodation of their 
interests); R. v. Sparrow, [1990] I S.C.R. 1075, 1077 (Can.) (declaring that the Crown is in a fiduciary 
relationship with aboriginal peoples and owes them a duty of consultation); New Zealand Maori Council 
v. Attorney-General, [1987] I N.Z.L.R. 641 (H.C.) (asserting that the Crown and the Maori are in a 
fiduciary relationship). 
158. See Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries art. 
6, June 27, 1989, 281.L.M. 1382 (supporting duty to consult); Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples arts. 3-5, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) (supporting self-
determination); id. art. 18 (supporting general participatory rights); id. arts. 15, 17, 19, 30, 32, 36, 38 
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One possible objection that does merit a reply, however, is that groups 
or peoples are collectivities rather than individuals, and the fiduciary theory 
seems to address solely the dignity of the individual considered as a free and 
self-determining agent. In what sense does a people (considered collectively) 
have dignity analogous to the dignity of the individual? The short answer is 
that peoples have dignity analogous to individuals because both are persons. 
Recall that Kant defines a person as "a subject whose actions can be imputed 
to him."159 If peoples, like states, may have the actions of their institutions and 
representatives imputed to them, then they too may be viewed as international 
law views states today, as artificial persons that require agents to act for 
them. 160 Peoples, in other words, are persons in the relevant, Kantian sense. 
Peoples, like individuals, have agency and dignity precisely because they are 
capable of autonomous self-determination. The primary difference is that 
someone must act on a people's behalf. But so long as those actions can be 
attributed to a people as such, a given people is a person and therefore worthy 
of respect in its own right. 
The dignity ofpersons from Kant's account of legality (and our account 
of jus co gens) includes and explains the human dignity of individuals because 
individuals are natural persons and therefore have moral personhood. But 
Kant's conception of dignity is wider than human dignity because it bears on 
artificial (nonhuman) persons as well as natural persons. Whereas for 
liberalism the basic unit of moral value is the natural person or individual, 161 
in Kant's theory of the right, the basic unit of value is the person, including 
artificial persons such as states and peoples. Thus, in addition to reasons 
derived from the interest of individuals to self-govern, the fiduciary theory 
calls on states to treat the right to self-determination as a peremptory norm, 
because a people's capacity for self-determination is constitutive of their 
moral personhood and the embodiment of their dignity. 
D. Nonperemptory Norms 
By specifying criteria for identifying peremptory norms, the fiduciary 
theory also offers a principled framework for distinguishing norms that do not 
qualify as jus cogens. To merit recognition as jus cogens, it is not enough for a 
norm to achieve widespread state acceptance or preserve orderly relations 
between states. Rather, the norm must satisfy the fiduciary theory's formal 
and substantive criteria, which limit jus cogens to formally satisfactory norms 
that are constitutive of the state-subject fiduciary relation. Guided by these 
concerns, the fiduciary theory's analytical framework eliminates from 
consideration a variety of international norms, which courts and commentators 
occasionally mischaracterize as jus cogens. 
159. KANT, supra note 4, at 50. 
160. Hobbes defined a person much as Kant later did, and characterized the state as an artificial 
person that can have its sovereign's actions imputed to it. See HOBBES, supra note 87, at 217-28. 
161. For discussion of the liberalism/communitarianism debate based on this premise, see WILL 
KYM! IrK A f.TRF:RAl.lSM f:OMMITNITY ANn On TITRE(19R9) 
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Some scholars have suggested, for example, that well-accepted maxims 
of international treaty law such as pacta sunt servanda, 16 or general 
principles of international jurisdiction such as the territorial principle, 163 
should be recognized as jus cogens. The rationale for including these norms is 
that they have achieved widespread acceptance across the international 
community and are constitutive of international law as a legal system. 164 The 
fiduciary theory counsels a different result. A state might very well discharge 
its fiduciary obligations faithfully by renouncing an onerous international 
agreement following a fundamental change of circumstances-as, for 
example, where goods earmarked for export under bilateral trade agreements 
are needed to avert local starvation following a natural disaster. 165 Similarly, 
the fiduciary theory of state sovereignty does not require the international 
community to respect a state's territorial jurisdiction over acts of genocide if 
national prosecution would result in a sham trial and impunity for the 
offenders. The mere fact that certain norms are well entrenched within 
international law is insufficient to distinguish them as jus co gens. 
Guided by this insight, the fiduciary theory also challenges conventional 
wisdom by excluding the venerable norm against piracy from the ranks of jus 
cogens. 166 Article 15 of the Convention on the High Seas, which is widely 
recognized as customary international law, defines piracy in relevant part as 
"illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or private aircraft."167 
Although such private acts may be illegal under international law, they are not 
violations of jus cogens because they do not in and of themselves address the 
limits of sovereign authority in the state-subject fiduciary relation. To merit 
recognition as a peremptory norm, the international norm against piracy 
would have to be repackaged as a constraint on state authority satisfying the 
fiduciary theory's formal and substantive criteria. This might be 
accomplished, for example, by shifting the piracy prohibition's focus from 
pure private conduct to state-sponsored or state-condoned piracy-practices 
162. See BROWNLIE, supra note 48, at 591-92 (defining pacta sunt servanda as the principle 
that treaties are binding between parties and must be performed in good faith). 
163. See id. at 299 ("The principle that the courts of the place where the crime is committed 
may exercise jurisdiction has received universal recognition .... "). 
164. See, e.g., Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of 
the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J.INT'L L. 741, 773 (2003) ("lfjus cogens is defined as a body 
of norms representing the core, nonderogable values of the community of states, then included in this 
body, arguably, is the principle of state jurisdiction .... "); Schwelb, supra note 44, at 965 (discussing 
pacta sunt servanda as a potential peremptory norm). 
165. See VCL T, supra note 2, art. 62 (permitting treaty termination or withdrawal under 
limited circumstances where there has been a "fundamental change of circumstances"); cf 
ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 41, at 44 (arguing that an agreement providing for derogation from pacta 
sunt servanda would be absurd). 
166. See BROWNLIE, supra note 48, at 489 (citing a rule prohibiting piracy as jus cogens); 
Levan Alexidze, Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in Contemporary International Law, 172-lll RECUEIL DES 
COURS 219,262 (1981) (same). 
167. Convention on the High Seas art. 15, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 
(emphasis added); see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. I 0 I, Dec. I 0, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 436 (adopting the High Seas Convention's language verbatim); BROWNLIE, supra 
note 48, at 229 (identifying the High Sea Convention's definition as customary international law). 
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tantamount to aggression. 168 Absent a clear nexus to the state-subject fiduciary 
relationship, however, the prohibition against piracy is best classified as a 
common cnme. 
To be sure, most well-recognized peremptory norms such as the 
prohibitions against slavery, genocide, and military aggression would retain 
their nonderogable status under the fiduciary theory of jus cogens. 
Nonetheless, the preceding examples demonstrate that the fiduciary theory 
would unsettle the prevailing status quo in important respects. As we have 
seen, the fiduciary theory constricts the potential scope of jus cogens by 
excluding important norms such as pacta sunt servanda and the prohibition 
against piracy. Conversely, the fiduciary theory expands jus cogens to 
encompass emerging norms that are constitutive of the state-subject fiduciary 
relation such as the right to due process, the prohibition against state 
corruption, and the principle of self-determination. The fiduciary theory thus 
addresses concerns about the perceived indeterminacy of jus cogens by 
furnishing a significantly more determinate framework for identifying 
peremptory norms than its competitors. 
E. Possible Objections to the Fiduciary Theory 
We anticipate that positivists will take issue with the fiduciary theory on 
the ground that it decouples peremptory norms from state consent without 
specifying an institution capable of generating, modifying, or interpreting 
peremptory norms. If we are correct, however, that peremptory norms are 
constitutive of the state-subject fiduciary relation itself-owing their 
nonderogable status to the moral demands of dignity rather than to the will of 
any state or nonstate actor-the positivist critique is fundamentally misguided. 
We do not mean to suggest that states and international institutions have no 
role to play in the progressive development of jus cogens. States bear primary 
responsibility for operationalizing peremptory norms in the first instance. 
When state practices attract criticism, the fiduciary theory may assist 
international organizations such as the United Nations Security Council, the 
United Nations Human Rights Council, and the ICJ to determine whether 
peremptory norms have been violated. The fiduciary theory thus invites the 
international community to employ its analytical framework as the foundation 
for a new international consensus, but without mistaking the intended 
consensus for the normative basis of jus co gens. 
Some might object that our theory undermines treaties and customary 
international law by rendering these sources superfluous to international 
human rights law. It does not. While we reject the positivist thesis that state 
consent constitutes the basis for peremptory norms' nonderogable character, 
the fiduciary theory continues to rely on these traditional modalities of 
168. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1956] 2 Y.B. 
Int'l L. Comm'n 253, 282, U.N. Doc. N3159 (suggesting in commentary to Article 100 that "[a]ny State 
having an opportunity of taking measures against piracy, and neglecting to do so, would be failing in a 
duty laid upon it by international law"); LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 215 (1961) ("Can there 
be any doubt that a treaty whereby two States agreed to permit piracy in a certain area, or against the 
mf"rc:h~nt ~hin"" nf:~ c:e:rt::.in S.t::lte:_ with imnnnitv wnulrl he nn11 ;:met voirl?") 
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international lawmaking to specify norms that satisfy the fiduciary theory's 
formal and substantive criteria. For example, the negotiation of multilateral 
instruments such as the ICCPR and the Genocide Convention has played a 
crucial role in generating specific human rights guarantees that in part 
implement the more general jus cogens norms which flow from the fiduciary 
theory's analytical framework. Moreover, since the fiduciary theory does not 
prescribe any particular enforcement mechanism for violations of peremptory 
norms, treaty regimes will continue to serve as important tools for 
coordinating the international community's response to grave abuses of the 
state-subject fiduciary relation. Thus, far from heralding the demise of treaties 
or custom, the fiduciary theory looks to them for the less abstract principles 
and rules that are necessary for the theory's practical application. 
Other readers might find our theory objectionable on the ground that it 
undervalues norms that target nonstate actors such as terrorists, corporate 
polluters, or perpetrators of domestic violence. 169 To be clear, the fiduciary 
theory does not aspire to establish a nonnative hierarchy within international 
law, distinguishing norms that are intrinsically "fundamental" or categorically 
"superior" from those of lesser importance. Private acts of terrorism, 
environmental despoliation, or domestic violence may be just as damaging as 
state acts, and norms proscribing abuses by nonstate actors may be just as 
fundamental to the interests of society as the peremptory norms against state-
based human rights abuses. 170 What distinguishes norms as peremptory vis-a-
vis states' other international obligations is not their relative importance in 
some abstract sense but rather their constitutive role as fiduciary constraints 
on a state's sovereign power. For this reason, our theory would not necessarily 
preclude the international community from specifying peremptory norms m 
the future to outlaw state-sponsored terrorism, state complicity m 
environmental despoliation, or state inattention to domestic violence. 
Lastly, there are those who argue that the very concept of jus cogens 
reflects a Western bias and fails to account for cultural diversity across the 
international community. 171 The fiduciary theory blunts the force of this 
objection by limiting jus cogens's scope to norms that embody common 
public values of integrity, fairness, and solicitude. Furthermore, the fiduciary 
concept cannot be easily dismissed as an expression of Western values alien to 
the traditional values of non-Western societies. Legal scholars have traced the 
fiduciary concept as far back as the Code of Hammurabi in Ancient 
169. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HUM. 
Rrs. Q. 63, 65-66 (1993) (criticizing the concept of jus cogens, which according to some accounts 
safeguards "'the most fundamental and highly-valued interests of international society,"' because it 
tends to exclude wrongs such as domestic violence that disproportionately affect women (quoting 
Cordon Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International Society, 28 VA. J. 
INT'L l. 585,587 (1988))}. 
170. See Christenson, supra note 169. Indeed, the importance of these prohibitions against 
private acts offensive to human rights is likely to become all the more significant for international 
society as the twenty-first century unfolds. See PHILIP BOBBITI, TERROR AND CONSENT (2008). 
I 71. See BEDERMAN, supra note 69, at 123 (noting that human dignity is a contested concept 
and that rights discourse is often perceived as a surrogate for the transmission of Western values); 
SHAW, supra note 38, at 118 ('The situation to be avoided is that of foisting peremptory norms upon a 
nnlitir.;:~l nr irlP.nlnoir.:~~l minnritv fnr th;:~t in thP lnno nm wnnlrl 11Pv;:~ltJP thP rnni"'Pnt ") 
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Mesopotamia (present-day Iraq), and have shown that concepts of fiduciary 
obligation informed not only Roman law and Germanic (Salic) law, but also 
Islamic law and the Jewish law of agency. 172 Indeed, the modem Anglo-
American law of trust owes a considerable debt to the waqf from Islamic 
law-an endowment created by a donor for use by designated beneficiaries 
and under the administration of a trustee-which was introduced to England 
by Franciscan friars returning from the Crusades in the thirteenth century. 173 
Even in non-Western societies that emphasize collective identities (for 
example, family, clan, nation, religion) over individual freedom and dignity, 
scholars have observed that implied fiduciary obligations structure public and 
private legal institutions. 174 Indeed, one contemporary Chinese philosopher 
has described "the ideal Confucian society as a 'fiduciary community' in 
which the corporate effort of the entire membership turned the grouf. into 'a 
society of mutual trust instead of a mere aggregate of individuals."' 75 Thus, 
while the debate over cultural relativism in international human rights 
discourse cannot be addressed fully in this Article, there are good reasons to 
believe that the fiduciary theory is less vulnerable to such concerns than other 
theories of jus cogens. 
We recognize, of course, that the fiduciary theory might challenge 
deeply engrained cultural values in some areas of the world. For example, 
states that discriminate arbitrarily among their subjects based on status or 
caste (e.g., apartheid) violate their peremptory obligations under the fiduciary 
theory, irrespective of whether such distinctions reflect traditional social 
norms. We take comfort, however, in observing that few states persist in 
defending policies of pervasive, invidious discrimination today, and fewer still 
seek to justify military aggression, torture, or corruption under the banner of 
cultural relativism. Moreover, the principle of popular sovereignty upon 
which the fiduciary theory rests cannot easily be rejected as Western-centric 
ideology, for it has become a deeply embedded principle of yeneral 
international law embraced throughout the international community. 76 The 
172. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 7-14 (2007); Avisheh Avini, The Origins of the 
Modern English Trust Revisited, 70 TuL. L. REv. 1139 (1996); Robert G. Natelson, The Government as 
Fiduciary: A Practical Demonstration from the Reign ofTrajan, 35 U. RICH. L. REv. 191 (2001). 
173. Avini,supranote 172,at 1140-43. 
174. See, e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law 
and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1599, 1607-08 (2000); see also 
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 240 (1999) ("The valuing of freedom is not confined to one 
culture only, and the Western traditions are not the only ones that prepare us for a freedom-based 
approach to social understanding."). 
175. Ruskola, supra note 174, at 1627 (quoting TU WEI-MING, CENTRALITY AND 
COMMONALITY: AN ESSAYONCHUNG-YUNG 67,81 (1976)). 
176. See. e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 13(1 ), June 27, 1981, 1520 
U.N.T.S 217 ("Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, 
either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law."); 
ICCPR, supra note 124, art. 25 ("Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity . .. [t)o take part 
in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives . . .. "); Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 142, art. 21 ("The will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of government .... "); Mortimer Sellers, Republican Principles in International Law, II 
CoNN. J. INT'L L. 403, 412-13 (1996) (examining historical materials and concluding that "(t)he 
fundamental republican principle of popular sovereignty ('imperium populii') has been at the core of the 
developing law of nations from the beginning"); Reisman, supra note 80. But see Jed Rubenfeld, 
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fiduciary theory thus calls upon states to honor their basic duties and pursue 
their aspirations as stewards for those subject to their power. 
V. FUTURE AVENUES OF INQUIRY 
We have argued above that the fiduciary model explains many of the 
currently recognized norms of jus cogens, disqualifies others, and supplies a 
robust analytical framework for identifying emerging peremptory norms. We 
have also argued that the fiduciary theory reconciles jus cogens with state 
sovereignty by showing how such norms are constitutive of a novel 
conception of popular sovereignty under international law. We conclude with 
a few brief comments on new avenues of inquiry suggested by the fiduciary 
understanding of jus co gens. 
A. Cosmopolitan Citizenship 
Under the fiduciary model, cosmopolitan citizenship emerges as the 
fiduciary principle's response to extraterritorial abuses of state power and 
intraterritorial abuses against nonsubjects. Individuals under occupation or 
subject to detention in a foreign jurisdiction may be more vulnerable to the 
power of a foreign state than they ordinarily would be vulnerable to the power 
of their own state. Because the fiduciary principle authorizes state power on 
behalf of every person subject to it, states can claim no greater entitlement to 
enslave or torture foreign nationals than they can claim vis-a-vis their own 
citizens. Just as children are born "citizens of the world" with an innate right 
to their parents' care, all individuals by virtue of their moral personhood and 
dignity are innately entitled to the protection of basic human rights against the 
powers that be, including not only their own state of residence but also the 
broader community of states, severally and collectively. If a state seeks to 
exercise its public powers over foreign nationals, the fiduciary principle 
dictates that the state must respect peremptory norms within the scope of these 
interactions even if the state does not undertake to establish a more formal or 
enduring state-subject relationship. This is the conception of cosmopolitan 
citizenship that the fiduciary view of public authority makes possible. 
One consequence of recognizing peremptory norms as constitutive of 
cosmopolitan citizenship is that detained foreign nationals enjoy due process 
rights even if they are apprehended and detained extraterritorially. We have 
argued above that due process is a peremptory norm under the fiduciary 
model. This insight suggests that academic inquiry and judicial opinions 
should move past the threshold question of whether foreign detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere are entitled to due process at all (they are ). 177 
Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1971 , 1986 (2004) ("[T)he fundamental point 
of international law, and particularly of international human rights law, was to check national 
sovereignty, emphatically including national popular sovereignty."). 
177. But see Robert Knowles & Marc D. Falcoff, Toward a Limited-Government Theory of 
Extraterritorial Detention, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 637, 665 (2007) (noting that the Bush 
Administration "has argued that it may detain non-citizens extraterritorially without according them any 
rlnP nrnr.PC:C: hPC':;:tii~P nnn-riti7Pnc:: fipt~inP:rl P.YtrntPrritnri~llv nnc:.c;;:pc;;:c;;: nn rlohtc:") · Tnno Yin Prnrorlurnl 
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Instead, scholars should focus their energies on clarifying the content of due 
process in cases involving foreign nationals, especially where national 
security concerns appear to weigh in favor of reduced protections. For 
example, are individuals detained abroad entitled to legal counsel? If so, 
should defense counsel have access to sensitive information (on a confidential 
basis) for the purpose of testing the government's evidence? What is the 
evidentiary burden the government must meet to keep foreign nationals 
detained? In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Boumediene v. Bush that detainees at Guantanamo Bay may challenge their 
confinement by petitioning for habeas corpus review in U.S. courts, these 
questions are especially pressing, for publicists and judges alike. 178 
Another field of future inquiry suggested by the fiduciary view of 
cosmopolitan citizenship concerns the underlying substantive justification of 
the Geneva Conventions, and humanitarian law generally. The positivist view 
of the Geneva Conventions is that they are binding on state parties because 
those parties consented to them. The fiduciary model, on the other hand, 
suggests that the protections contained within the Geneva Conventions are 
good candidates for jus cogens status because respect for them is necessary to 
satisfy the principle of equal security from the fiduciary theory's analytical 
framework: even in times of war, mistreatment of prisoners or noncombatants 
is unlawful because it infringes upon their fundamental equal security. This 
conclusion is supported by Article 4 of the ICCPR and Article 15 of the 
European Convention, which permit derogations from some treaty rights in 
times of emergency, but only if those derogations are consistent with the state 
party's "other obligations under international law." 179 As the travaux 
preparatoires make clear, these obligations are intended to refer to those 
enshrined in the Geneva Conventions and humanitarian law generally. 180 The 
fiduciary theory's formal and substantive criteria offer a vehicle for 
distinguishing which of these obligations qualify for peremptory treatment. 
The fiduciary conception of cosmopolitan citizenship also resonates with 
Kant's idea of hospitality, and offers a fresh perspective on the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention). 181 The 
Refugee Convention obligates state parties to provide asylum to individuals 
fleeing persecution. On the fiduciary theory, the Refugee Convention 
formalizes and makes concrete a fiduciary duty of hospitality which states 
owe to individuals who arrive at their borders effectively stateless. The 
Due Process To Determine "Enemy Combatant" Status in the War on Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REv. 351, 
365 (2007) ("Whether a nonresident alien outside the [United States] has due process rights remains an 
unsettled question, due in part to the existence of conflicting lines of cases."). 
178. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2266-71 (2008) (applying due process analysis 
to determine the need for habeas corpus); see also id. at 2279 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority for granting habeas corpus "without bothering to say what due process rights the detainees 
possess"). 
179. ICCPR, supra note 124, art. 4(1); see also European Convention, supra note 124, art. 
15(1). 
180. See, e.g., ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, 6th Sess., !95th mtg., supra note 125, at 
45; ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, 6th Sess., !96th mtg., supra note 125, at 20. 
181. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150. 
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fiduciary theory thus clarifies how states' international obligations of 
hospitality and nonrefoulment constitute peremptory norms emanating from 
asylum seekers' moral capacity to place states under legal and moral 
obligations to provide for their basic security. 
A further issue that arises from the fiduciary conception of cosmopolitan 
citizenship is whether, or to what extent, states are bound to treat nationals 
and nonnationals alike under the principle of formal moral equality. The 
conventional view underlying immigration law is that citizenship bestows 
certain rights, denizens are not citizens, and therefore the state is not required 
to treat denizens as if they were citizens in all respects. 182 The fiduciary theory 
does not necessarily abolish the traditional distinction between citizens and 
denizens, though it casts the distinction in a new light. Insofar as foreign 
nationals are entitled to claim legal entitlements or rights to political 
participation within their country of origin, the fiduciary theory does not 
necessarily obligate another state to duplicate or supplement those 
entitlements in the name of formal moral equality. For example, resident 
aliens may not enjoy the full panoply of political rights held by citizens, such 
as the right to vote and run for public office, unless and until they acquire 
citizenship. The fiduciary theory does require respect for human rights, 
however, and there is no reason in principle to suppose that either the 
peremptory or "ordinary" human rights of foreign nationals are any less 
obligatory under the fiduciary principle than citizens' human rights. For 
instance, the fiduciary theory would not permit states to use strict 
nationalization rules to enforce a de facto caste system. While we cannot 
begin in this Article to work out the details of the proper relationship between 
human rights and citizenship rights, the fiduciary model hints that the latter 
must seek to accommodate the former because human rights are constitutive 
of state sovereignty, including the state's sovereign authority to confer 
citizenship. Thus, under the fiduciary theory the differential treatment of 
foreign nationals cannot consist in differential restrictions of human rights, 
with the possible exception of certain political rights such as the right to vote. 
B. The Fiduciary Character of International Order 
If the state is a fiduciary of the individuals subject to its power, what 
then is the relationship between the international legal order as a whole and 
the individual? Arguably, this relationship too has a fiduciary character in that 
the international community may act as a surrogate guarantor of jus cogens if 
the state flagrantly violates peremptory norms. On the view defended here, the 
fiduciary principle authorizes the international community to act as a 
surrogate guarantor because the fiduciary principle seeks always to vindicate 
the individual's innate right to be treated as a person with equal dignity. If the 
state breaches its fiduciary obligation to so treat the individual, then, to the 
182. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) ("[T]his Court has firmly and 
repeatedly endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be 
unacceptable if applied to citizens."); Charkaoui V. Canada, [2007] I S.C.R. 350, 2007 sec 9 (Can.); 
Canada v. Chiarelli, [1992] I S.C.R. 711 (Can.). 
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extent practicable, the international community must fill the void. Indeed, the 
peremptory norms of international law make international legal order possible 
and, ultimately, these norms trace their justification back to the dignity of the 
person. 
The fiduciary character of international order is perceptible in a variety 
of contexts. For example, the fiduciary principle arguably authorizes the 
international community through the United Nations to establish transitional 
administrations to assist transitional states in establishing democratic and legal 
institutions that reflect their people's sovereignty. 183 The fiduciary nature of 
the international legal order might also obligate the international community 
to provide disaster and famine relief, as well as impose a duty to address life-
threatening poverty in the south, along the lines suggested by cosmopolitan 
scholars such as Thomas Pogge. 184 Hence, the fiduciary view reinforces the 
distributive account of international human rights law discussed earlier in that 
both seek to mitigate the deleterious effects of current distributions and abuses 
of sovereign power. Of course, much more would have to be said to defend 
the idea (if it is defensible) that the international community's redistributive 
obligations are mandated by jus cogens, and any such argument would have to 
contend with difficult questions about the extent to which the state is entitled 
to favor the claims of its residents over nonsubjects. 
Finally, and most contentiously, the fiduciary structure of international 
order might supply a basis for humanitarian intervention in extreme cases 
where states systematically violate peremptory norms. Insofar as the 
international community stands as a surrogate guarantor of human rights 
protected under jus cogens, the fiduciary structure of international order may 
permit intervention by the coordinated action of the international community 
as a whole. 185 It is far less clear, however, whether the fiduciary principle 
would supply the same warrant to individual states that wish to engage in 
unilateral humanitarian intervention, notwithstanding individuals' claims of 
cosmopolitan citizenship against foreign states. Arguably, third-party states 
should pursue a collective response to egregious violations of human rights 
because the international community alone and as a whole (not third-party 
183. See. e.g., S.C. Res. 1272, ~ 1, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999) (establishing the 
United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor to "be endowed with overall responsibility for the 
administration of East Timor and ... empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, 
including the administration of justice"); S.C. Res. 1244, ~ 10, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1244 (June 10, 1999) 
(creating the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo to "provide transitional 
administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-
governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and nonnallife for all inhabitants of Kosovo"). 
184. THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS 177-81 (2002) . 
185. See INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT, at xi (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf ("Where a 
population is suffering serious hann, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, 
and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields 
to the international responsibility to protect."). 
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states) stands in the position of surrogate guarantor of human rights for all 
individuals within the international community. 186 
C. The State as Agent 
While much of our discussion has focused on the fiduciary state's 
specific obligation to secure legal order in the domestic sphere, at 
international law the state has another specific fiduciary obligation. The state 
must represent its people and act on their behalf as their agent. This obligation 
opens up additional lines of inquiry that a number of commentators have 
already begun to explore. 187 For example, state officials cannot acquire public 
debts to enrich themselves, and plausibly creditor states that lend money to 
corrupt governments with actual or constructive knowledge of their corruption 
are not entitled to collect these odious debts. Yet another implication of the 
state's fiduciary position as agent is that it cannot delegate or contract out 
essential fiduciary obligations of statehood (e.g., the state's duties to 
guarantee equal security and the rule of law) without providing adequate 
safeguards to those affected by the delegated powers. Fruitful future inquiry 
could elaborate on the content of these safeguards in various contexts such as 
extradition and state delegation to military contractors. 
D. Peremptory Norms and Obligations Erga Ornnes 
A further implication of the fiduciary theory is to call into question the 
popular concept of obligations erga omnes in internationallaw. 188 Contrary to 
the ICJ's classic statement in Barcelona Traction, a state's peremptory duty to 
refrain from acts of genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination are not "[b]y 
their very nature" "obligations of a State towards the international community 
as a whole." 189 Rather, a state "is bound to extend ... the protection of the law 
and assumes obligations concerning the treatment to be afforded" 
individuals-whether nationals or nonnationals-because these norms are 
constitutive of the fiduciary authorization of state sovereignty. 190 Under the 
fiduciary conception of cosmopolitan citizenship, states bear fiduciary 
obligations toward all persons subject to state power, and accordingly 
186. See Thorburn, supra note 127 (noting that, because public powers are fiduciary in nature, 
they must be exercised consistent with an ex ante permission or authorization that is public rather than 
private in nature). 
187. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of 
Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1238-39 (2007); King, supra note 121. 
188. See Byers, supra note 39, at 211 (defining erga omnes rules as "rules, which, if violated, 
give rise to a general right of standing"). 
189. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 19). 
States may, of course, voluntarily assume obligations to other states regarding their human rights 
observance by consenting to multilateral conventions or international custom. But these consensual 
obligations are distinguishable from both the nonderogable duties that arise from the state-subject 
fiduciary relation (jus cogens) and state obligations "toward the international community as a whole" 
(erga omnes). /d. 
190. /d. 
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vulnerable persons but not states are the relevant rights-bearers for bringing 
claims based on jus co gens violations. 
This is not to suggest, of course, that the international community ought 
to be indifferent to genocide, slavery, or apartheid. As we have seen, the 
international community-acting through organizations such as the U.N. 
Security Council-may serve as a secondary guarantor of human rights. An 
international tribunal might consider this guarantor role sufficient justification 
to allow states to bring next-friend claims on behalf of individuals who have 
suffered jus cogens violations in other states. Nevertheless, while the result 
achieved by so-called erga omnes obligations might be defensible, the concept 
of obligations erga omnes as applied to peremptory norms is not. Absent a 
procedural right conferred by treaty, states cannot claim any material interest 
of their own in another state's human rights observance. Thus, whatever 
salience the concept of obligations erga omnes may have in other contexts, 
"the basic rights of the human person" discussed in Barcelona Traction do not 
l "fy h 191 qua 1 as sue . 
E. Nonabsolute Human Rights 
As we have discussed, most human rights, such as freedom of 
expression or association, can admit of derogation or limitation. 192 But it bears 
emphasizing that the fiduciary model requires states to respect these 
"ordinary" human rights, too. Ordinary human rights satisfy the fiduciary 
theory's formal and substantive criteria: they vindicate the principle of 
integrity by presupposing that state officials cannot self-deal, they affirm the 
formal moral equality of individuals, and they directly express solicitude for 
the dignity and well-being of the individual. Therefore, under the fiduciary 
theory, "ordinary" human rights are presumptively mandatory. What is less 
clear and worthy of further research is whether the fiduciary conception of 
sovereignty points to conditions under which derogation from these norms is 
permissible. 
We have seen that the ICCPR and the European Convention permit 
derogation in times of emergency. Human rights treaties also permit 
restrictions of certain rights when the interests those rights protect are clearly 
outweighed by more pressing considerations, such as the rights of others. For 
example, Article 18(3) of the ICCPR allows states to impose some restrictions 
on freedom of religion, but only if the restrictions are "prescribed by law and 
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others."193 So, for example, freedom of 
religion cannot be called upon to defend acts of violence against nonbelievers. 
191. /d. at 32. 
192. See supra Part IV. 
193. ICCPR, supra note 124, art. 18(3). Articles 12 (freedom of movement), 19 (freedom of 
expression), 21 (peaceful assembly), and 22 (freedom of association) of the ICCPR contain similar 
limitation clauses. Likewise, section I of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides for a 
similar proportionality test on the basis of the principles of "a free and democratic society." Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
A,-t lOll? ,-h 11 ~ 1 (TJT< \ 
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When the state limits nonabsolute rights in defense of other fundamental 
rights and freedoms, the fiduciary model suggests that it bears a burden to 
justify its actions publicly, and thereby accept legal and political responsibility 
for its actions. In other words, restrictions on nonabsolute, derogable rights 
must pass a test of proportionality, and they must always take the form of a 
publicly defensible justification that meets certain legal standards. 
The test of proportionality immediately raises questions of who gets the 
last word on the interpretation of human rights, the judiciary or the legislature. 
The more immediate concern from the standpoint of the fiduciary model, 
however, is the requirement of public reason-giving itself. 194 On the fiduciary 
theory, this requirement reflects the foundational idea that sovereignty 
ultimately resides in the people: the state must ground its actions in reasonable 
justifications to ensure that individuals are subject to the rule of law, not 
arbitrary exercises of public power. While specifying the exact form and 
nature of this justification lies beyond the scope of this paper, such 
justifications would have to take seriously the substantive principles from the 
fiduciary framework, namely: integrity, formal moral equality, solicitude, 
equal security, and the procedural demands of the rule oflaw. 
F. Legal Consequences of Breaches of Peremptory Norms 
The eminent publicist Christian Tomuschat suggests that legal inquiry 
into jus co gens is a two-stage endeavor: ( 1) identify the peremptory norm, and 
(2) determine the legal consequences that flow from the norm's breach. 195 
This Article has focused on establishing a theory capable of guiding inquiry 
under the first stage of Tomuschat's framework. The specific legal 
consequences that would flow from a breach of jus cogens and the optimal 
enforcement vehicles for securing state compliance with jus cogens may be 
highly context dependent and subject to further considerations beyond the 
scope of this study. An interesting issue in this regard is whether a state that 
regularly violated peremptory norms would have the legal capacity under 
international law to enter binding treaties or otherwise act as an agent of its 
people at the international level. With respect to civil remedies for specific 
breaches of jus cogens, space permits us to signal only that the remedies 
available should seek to make the wronged person whole, thereby rectifying 
(to the extent practicable) the past wrong. Happily, the fiduciary character of 
state legal authority offers a fruitful starting point for future consideration of 
these critical issues. 
194. This requirement has been a major focus of public lawyers from diverse jurisdictions. See, 
e.g., DYZENHAUS, supra note 146 (asserting that legal order consists largely in a public culture of 
justification); Paul Craig, Unreasonableness and Proportionality in UK Law, in THE PRINCIPLE OF 
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE 85 (Evelyn Ellis ed., 1999) (observing that the principle of 
proportionality was a part of U.K. administrative law prior to its accession to the European Convention 
in 1998). 
195. Christian Tomuschat, Reconceptualizing the Debate on Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga 
Omnes-Conc/uding Observations, in THE fUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
- . . 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has developed a fiduciary theory of jus cogens with the aim 
to furnish a more persuasive explanation for peremptory norms and their 
relationship to state sovereignty under international law. We have argued that 
peremptory norms such as the prohibitions against slavery and torture are not 
exceptions to state sovereignty, but rather constitutive constraints flowing 
from the state-subject fiduciary relationship itself. States must honor 
peremptory norms as basic safeguards of dignity because they stand in a 
fiduciary relationship with all persons subject to their power and therefore 
bear specific duties to guarantee equal security under the rule of law. This 
fiduciary model of state sovereignty advances international human rights 
discourse beyond vague notions of "public policy," "international consensus," 
and "normative hierarchy" toward a more theoretically defensible and 
analytically determinate account of peremptory norms. 
We recognize, of course, that this Article constitutes only a first step in 
understanding the fiduciary model's implications for international human 
rights law. Many important questions require further consideration. For 
example, it remains to be seen how the fiduciary theory's analytical 
framework would apply to various norms not discussed in this Article that 
have been identified elsewhere as candidates for peremptory treatment. 196 
Additional consideration should be devoted, as well, to unpacking the 
fiduciary model's consequences for future litigation to enforce alleged jus 
cogens violations, including such threshold concerns as standing, sovereign 
immunity, causes of action, compulsory jurisdiction, forums, and remedies. 
Equally important, the legal dynamic between the state-subject fiduciary 
relation and the international community's surrogate guarantor role warrants 
more detailed attention than we have been able to devote in this Article. 
Addressing these questions will be essential to determine the specific legal 
consequences that flow from a breach of jus cogens. This Article has 
attempted to provide a sound theoretical basis from which this more fine-
grained inquiry may proceed. 
196. See, e.g., Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 169, at 75 (asserting that jus cogens should 
"give prominence to a range of other human rights" including "the right to sexual equality" and the right 
"to food"); David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a N01m of 
Jus Cogens: ClarifYing the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 219 (2005) (arguing that sexual 
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